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ABSTRACT 
The advancement and access of technology by terrorism subjects who plan and 
operate from under-governed or lawless lands has forced the U.S. to consider the 
demands the international threat environment places upon its security.  More importantly 
is how the U.S. will adapt to meet these threats, prevent attacks and convict those who 
mean to do the nation harm.  This thesis contends the modern day terrorism threat falls 
within the seams of the military, intelligence and law enforcement disciplines. The threat 
requires the fusion of these elements of national power to prevent attacks, collect vital 
intelligence and facilitate the use of key evidence to achieve substantive convictions.   In 
order to achieve convictions the need for damming evidence is essential.  However, with 
the fusion of the military, intelligence and law enforcement disciplines comes the 
problem of utilizing classified information as evidence to achieve end game convictions 
of capture terrorist subjects.  The recommendations in this thesis can facilitate the use of 
classified intelligence as evidence by establishing a legal U.S. preventative detention 
system, a full and permanent integration of FBI personnel with SOCOM assets and 
establishing NCTC as a central planning and coordinating organization with the authority 
to direct counterterrorism operations.   
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I know that some people question if America is really in a war at all. 
They view terrorism more as a crime, a problem to be solved mainly with 
law enforcement and indictments…After the chaos and carnage of 
September 11th, it is not enough to serve our enemies with legal papers.  
The terrorists and their supporters declared war on the United States, 
and war is what they got. 
President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, January 20, 2004 
The chief mission of U.S. law enforcement…is to stop another attack 
and apprehend any accomplices to terrorists before they hit us again.  
Attorney General John Ashcroft, National Security Council Meeting, 
September 12, 2001(as reported by Bob Woodward in Bush at War) 
On September 11, 2001, 19 foreign terrorists committed the largest and most 
deadly terrorist attack on the United States of America.  The attackers succeeded in 
killing several thousand innocent persons, severely impacted the U.S. economy, and 
instilled a fear and revealed vulnerabilities that the country had never previously 
experienced.  As a result, in an attempt to prevent and mitigate any future attacks, 
agencies were reorganized, new ones were created, and an offensive military strategy was 
adopted. 
The implementation of the offensive military strategy by the United States and its 
allies have required them to deal with the results of using both armed forces and criminal 
investigative tools to bring terror perpetrators to justice (Scheffer, 2001).  The success of 
this “prevention-first” counterterrorism scheme is evidenced by the lack of a successful 
internationally orchestrated domestic attack in over eight years, the disruption of 28 
terrorist plots against the U.S. homeland (McNeill, 2009) and hundreds of captured 
suspected terrorist operatives and enemy combatants.  Included in this group are High 
Value Detainees (HVDs), considered some of Al Qaeda’s most senior operatives and 
planners, among them:  Khalid Sheik Mohammad, Abu Faraj Al-Libi and Riduan bin 
Isomuddin Hambali (DefenseLink, 2009).  As Supreme Court university scholar Howard 
Ball indicates, the stated principal purpose for designating those captured on and off the 
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battlefield as “unlawful enemy combatants,” and not as Prisoners of War (POW),1 was to 
authorize interrogations of those individuals to gain actionable intelligence information 
regarding the military plans of the enemy (Ball, 2007).  It was also to incapacitate the 
terrorist subject from rejoining his radical organization. However, once interrogation and 
intelligence collection were completed, the critical question became what legal process 
should be and could be undertaken to punish and incapacitate them?  In other words, 
what was the “endgame?”  A subsequent and equally important question is, “who is 
coordinating the endgame?”  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In 2008, at the direction of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)2 through the Senior Inter-Agency Strategy 
Team (SIST)3 (Maguire 2008) identified strategic impediments to meeting objectives as 
outlined in the National Implementation Plan for the War on Terrorism (NIP).  These 
impediments or problems, if not addressed, would adversely impact the capability of 
agencies from successfully meeting their respective NIP objectives. One such identified 
impediment, and the central problem to be addressed in this thesis, is the lack of central 
leadership or permanent interagency structure that can strategically facilitate the proper 
collection, handling and disposition of classified intelligence information for use as 
evidence in the prosecution of terrorist subjects (Best, 2010; NCTC, 2008).   
Not addressing this issue will place the United States and its allies in a difficult 
predicament on how to lawfully dispose of terrorists once they have been exploited for 
their intelligence value.  The problem on how and where the 20 or so HVDs in 
                                                 
1 The Third Geneva Convention of 1949 does not permit the interrogations of POWs nor physical or 
mental torture or any form of coercion to obtain information of any kind outside of name, rank and 
identification number. 
2 National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), authorized under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004, is responsible for strategic operational counterterrorism planning which integrates 
all elements of national power.  NCTC is responsible for ensuring U.S. government-wide assimilation of 
counterterrorism intelligence and operations, cutting across agency boundaries both domestically and 
internationally. This planning is manifested in the National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror 
(NIP), approved by President Bush in June 2008. (NCTC, 2008)    
3 The SIST is comprised of senior representatives from all the participating inter-agency partners who 
are assigned to NCTC for two-year increments to develop the NIP.   
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Guantanamo Bay will be tried while being able to fully capitalizing on, at a minimum, 
the most compelling and damming classified evidence available substantiates this 
position.  Fear that critical and key evidence needed for conviction will be excluded due 
to the inability of Article III Federal Courts or the Classified Information Protection Act 
(CIPA) to protect the sensitivity of the information will allow a hard-core terrorist 
operative to go free or receive a minimal sentence. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Considering the modern day terrorism threat and circumstances posed to the 
national and homeland security of the United States, a question that must be asked is: Do 
Federal Article III courts meet the demands to effectively combat the modern day 
terrorism threat posed to U.S. national and homeland security?  If the answer is no,  then 
what steps should be taken to facilitate the use, or mitigate the exclusion of, classified 
intelligence information that is used to identify, locate and capture terrorist subjects, as 
evidence in their legal prosecution?   
This thesis, using the applied methodology, will seek to answer the first question 
while identifying the steps that should be strongly considered to bridge any deficiencies 
in the current system.  The intent of this project is initiate a fuller and more intense look 
by the professional and academic national security communities by providing analysis 
and recommendations that will compel a more robust discussion, body of literature and 
solutions that fuses the essential elements of disruption, intelligence collection and 
prosecution.  The fundamental goal is to compel an instituted strategic and coordinated 
end game for terrorist subjects through the inclusion of classified evidence. 
C. KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
“The War on Terrorism” did not begin on September 11, 2001.  That date simply 
marked America’s acknowledgement that it was indeed embroiled in a brutal conflict that 
stretched well beyond the bounds of criminal acts and threatened the national and 
homeland security of the nation.  Encouraged by the fall of the Soviet empire following 
its withdrawal from Afghanistan and by weak uncoordinated U.S. responses to the 1993 
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events in Somalia, the 1993 Trade Center bombing, the 1996 Khobar Towers attack, the 
1998 Africa Embassy bombings and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole, Al Qaeda set its 
sights on delivering a perceived devastating blow in September 2001.  Until that point, 
the U.S. chose to address the issue of terrorism as simply a law enforcement dilemma.  
Though there were some pre-9/11 successes achieved in the apprehension and conviction 
of terrorist subjects, it was not until the full force of American power was brought to bear 
on the Al Qaeda threat that significant degradation of group yielded a cessation of 
attacks.   
If the U.S. is to maintain its current advantage in this conflict, the following key 
assumptions are necessary in addressing the issues presented in this thesis:   
1. The U.S. priority in confronting the terrorism conundrum will be to 
prevent attacks against the homeland, allies and overseas interests.  This 
first assumption predisposes the critical necessity of aggressively 
obtaining vital intelligence information through the exploitation of 
classified intelligence collection techniques, close liaison with foreign 
intelligence partners and the interrogation of captured terrorist subjects.   
2. Terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda will continue to seek and utilize 
lawless ungoverned areas such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
of Pakistan (FATA), East Africa/Somalia or Trans Sahara Africa to train, 
plan and execute attacks.  This second assumption is essential to 
understanding that even with the most skilled and capable law 
enforcement investigators, the feasibility and reality of pursuing and 
arresting terrorist operatives in such anarchistic environments is decidedly 
remote. This premise will continue to necessitate, to varying degrees, the 
U.S. government’s utilization of armed forces capabilities, and more 
specifically, clandestine military and para-military special operations.   
3. As the battlefield and political landscapes continuously morph, the means 
by which the apprehension and disposition of terrorist operatives will also 
need to constantly be adjusted.  This assumption underscores the credence 
that approaching terrorism from solely a military, intelligence or law 
enforcement angle will ultimately be ineffective and result in further 
deadly attacks.  This underlies the necessity to seek a balance in the 
application of American power or utilize certain capabilities when 
situations dictate one method over another.   
4. Finally, the U.S. will continuously seek to impose the greatest and most 
substantial punishment permitted by law regarding the ultimate disposition 
of captured terrorist subjects.  This final assumption accentuates the need 
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to incapacitate terrorist individuals to the greatest degree possible while 
administering due justice on convictions achieved with the full scope of 
the information available that clearly demonstrates their deadly actions 
and intent. 
As pointed out in his March 2009 Center for Homeland Defense and Security 
(CHDS) thesis, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent Eric Smith, 
surmised that the U.S. has continuously been forced to consider the employment of 
military, intelligence or law enforcement capabilities against terrorism targets.  Smith 
recounts that in 1998, following the U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa, the Clinton 
National Security Council debated whether Usama Bin Laden was a military target or a 
subject to the legal process.  Furthermore, Smith cites Steve Coll’s Ghost Wars regarding 
then Secretary of State Albright’s answer as to what decision had been reached.  Albright 
stated, “We decided it was both.”  Secretary of Defense Cohen remarked that being 
forced to choose whether Bin Laden was a military or law enforcement target was a 
“false choice” and that all instruments of national power must be brought to bear 
simultaneously (Smith, 2009).  Tragically, for nearly 3,000 victims and their families 
some three years later, that conclusion was never fully implemented.     
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A review of the current relevant literature that discusses possible mitigating 
solutions to the identified NIP impediment is varied.  In some areas, the discussion 
focuses on the use of “secret evidence,” the applicability of the Classified Information 
Procedures Act (CIPA), and the debate for the need and constitutionality of preventative 
detention and Military Commissions as a judicial venue to try terrorist subjects.  Other 
areas focused on examining the lessons learned and models of foreign nations in their 
dealing with the terrorism issue.  Finally, a review of successful inter-agency models and 
concepts regarding the establishment of an inter-agency architecture that  develops a 
coordinated strategy for pursuing terrorist subjects while taking steps to mitigate the loss 
of classified intelligence as evidence.   
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1. Preventative Detention, CIPA and Military Commissions 
The issue of preventative detention is interwoven with the issues of intelligence 
collection, classified evidence, military commissions, and the conflicts with civil due 
process.  The literature appears to confirm the widely accepted predicament of balancing 
the government’s need to protect the sources, methods, and techniques utilized to collect 
sensitive classified information in order to prevent terrorist attacks, versus, adhering to 
transparent constitutional principals and due process. The literature reviewed in this area 
indicates two apparent schools of thought or sub-literatures in this area.    
The first sub-literature argues against the constitutionality of preventative 
detention and military commissions while supporting the use of CIPA as a means to 
introduce classified information into the federal judicial process.  A 2005 article in the 
Harvard Law Review provides an excellent summary of this literature and supports the 
views of Schulhofer and Turner (2005), Fitzpatrick (2002) and Robertson (2005).  The 
review cites federal judge James Robertson’s partial granting of a habeas corpus petition 
to Salim Ahmed Hamdan (Higham, 2004) and challenging the lawfulness of his trial by 
military commission.  Judge Robertson’s statement regarding the significant deviation 
from the confrontation clause in the Sixth Amendment that “it would not pass muster in 
any U.S. federal court” resulted in an immediate halt to the commission process at the 
time (Harvard Law Review, 2005).  The Harvard Law Review continues by arguing the 
use of CIPA and Military rule of Evidence (MRE) 5054 have been used for criminal 
prosecutions as means to protect classified information whereby the government can 
substitute summaries of classified documents for the documents themselves. This follows 
the presentation of the classified information to the judge in camera to determine if the 
classified information itself is: 1) Relevant to the case; 2) Whether it would be helpful to 
the defense.  The result is neither the defendant nor his uncleared counsel ever see the 
actual classified documents permitting a criminal prosecution to go forward (Uniform 
Code of Military Justice [UCMJ] 505).  They further argue the federal courts already  
 
                                                 
4 Military Rule of Evidence 505 largely mirrors CIPA and similarly permits the government to use 
substitution procedures in court-martial proceedings (UCMJ, A22-40, Rule 505).  
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possess the tools needed for protecting classified evidence while supporting the 
adversarial system, with the capability to evolve and adapt procedures to meet new 
quandaries as they arise.   
The second sub-literature espousing a counter viewpoint is similarly recent and 
robust but paints a different picture; it argues for congressional legislative action to 
regularize a process for a new legal architecture for preventative detention.  There are 
well-supported arguments for the creation of Federal Terrorism Court that would be 
designed to handle the complex nature of preventative detention, classified evidence, and 
transparent due process.  This sub-literature also contends that CIPA in its current form is 
not intended and ill suited for use in terrorism trials.  A segment of the work in this area 
strongly supports the constitutionality of military commissions and the designation of 
terrorist subjects as unlawful enemy combatants.    
In a January 2007 article for the Harvard Journal of Law, Department of Justice 
(DOJ) civil rights attorney James Boeving asserts the court’s attempt to rely upon the 
provisions of CIPA to protect classified information is not consistent with the legislative 
history of the Act, nor does it provide adequate protection of U.S. national security 
interests in terrorism trials.  Boeving contends that CIPA would need to be amended to 
better suit terrorism judicial procedure in preventing the disclosure of sensitive classified 
information.  Similarly, the Heritage Foundation’s James Carafano and Paul Rosenzweig 
in a 2004 Legal Memorandum briefly discuss CIPA’s fallibility in protecting highly 
sensitive information provided by foreign governments (Carafano & Rosenzweig, 2004).   
Unlike the first set of sub-literature, Carafano, Rosenzweig and Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) attorney Stephanie Blum delve into the issue of preventative 
detention as a way of addressing the need for intelligence collection via interrogation and 
incapacitation (Carafano & Rosenzweig, 2004; Carafano, 2006; Blum, 2008). In each of 
their publications, Carafano, Rosenzweig and Blum clearly express the need for 
legislative action to establish a settled structured legal process for preventative detention.  
A comprehensive, integrated legal structure will be needed in the future, and, in their 
view, the exercise of those powers is better constrained, and civil liberties better 
protected, if the exercise is regularized (Carafano & Rosenzweig, 2004).   
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The final aspect of this examined sub-literature directly confronts the critics 
regarding the constitutionality of establishing and utilizing military commissions or the 
designation of terrorist subjects as unlawful enemy combatants.  These distinctions are 
crucial.  They dictate the rights, rules and processes to which those captured and detained 
will be subjected.  Christopher Evans, in an April 2002 article for the Duke Law Journal, 
asserts President Bush’s November 2001 Military Order to convene military commissions 
is constitutional under Ex parte Quirin.5  The publications by former Bush Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, Professor John Yoo, are of 
particular significance.  In his book, War by Other Means, Yoo details the legal 
validation supporting enemy combatant designations and preventative detention policies 
(Blum, 2008). 
2. Foreign Models in the War on Terrorism 
An examination of the literature in this area focused on comparisons with other 
Democracies, namely the U.K., Israel and France, who have historically dealt with the 
issue of terrorism.  Authors such as Shapiro (2003), Schulhofer (2004) and Blum (2008) 
identify processes and procedures that, though controversial, have been effective and 
could potentially be adapted to a U.S. legal framework.   
There is a portion of sub-literature that is particularly critical of the Bush 
administration’s preventative detention policies and implementation of extrajudicial 
military commissions.  In a 2004 article in the Michigan Law Review, Schulhofer accuses 
the Bush administration of considerably diluting normal judicial checks on matters 
pertaining to the detention of civilians.  In an October 2008 article for the Homeland 
Security Affairs Journal and in Chapter V of her Naval Postgraduate School CHDS 
thesis, Stephanie Blum conducts an excellent account and analysis of the preventative 
detention regimes of Britain and Israel.  Blum lays out the significant differences between 
the preventive detention regimes of Israel and Britain compared to the U.S. enemy 
combatant policy.   
                                                 
5 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942) (upholding President Roosevelt’s power to establish military 
commissions for violations of the law of war by enemy saboteurs during World War II). 
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A collateral sub-literature focuses more on the development of a full legal 
architecture to deal with the terrorism issue.  Shapiro and Suzan in their 2003 article for 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies take a step-by-step account of the French 
experience and evolution from the 1970s sanctuary doctrine to the development of a stout 
national terrorism court (Shapiro & Suzan, 2003).  Carafano also discusses the British 
history of terrorism and current legal model, while Ludo Block of the Jamestown 
Foundation presents excellent insights into the French counter-terrorism pre-emptive 
judicial approach utilizing specially created privileged relationships between intelligence 
services and dedicated terrorism magistrates (Block, 2005).   
3. Interagency Integration, Models and Concepts 
In this section, a review of literature pertaining to interagency models and 
integration varied.  There was little in the way of examples for specific models that dealt 
with Department of Defense (DoD) and DOJ/FBI integration.  Some documents could be 
found that discussed the larger U.S. government interagency structure while a number of 
documents discussed reorganization of the interagency security framework but on a 
macro level.  The literature available for review was limited to some policy papers, some 
scholarly journal articles and congressional testimony relating to the 9/11 Commission.  
A 2008 National Defense University paper by Alan Whitaker, Fredrick Smith and 
Elizabeth McKune describes the current organizational structure of the National Security 
Council (NSC), while defining the roles of the key departments and agencies.  The paper 
also outlines and provides comments on how new homeland defense and security 
organizational structures are being implemented into the interagency process (Whittaker, 
Smith & McKune, 2008). This paper provides insight into where a potential interagency 
unit or strategy team, as previously mentioned, could reside.  
In searching for literature that could provide insight into a successful structure or 
architecture, a 2006 article in Joint Forces Quarterly by Richard Yeatman, was one of 
few documents that discuss current integrated, yet proven interagency achievement.  
Yeatman points to the highly successful Joint Interagency Task Force-SOUTH (JIATF-
S), as a model with a 17-year history of effective integration, cooperation and fantastic 
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execution.  Though the JIATF-S model is a military establishment, this mock-up can 
easily be established with civilian law enforcement agencies in the lead and DoD 
components in supporting roles.  P. H. Liotta of the U.S. Naval War College supports the 
position of a DOJ/FBI led “terrorist strategy task force” in his 2002 article for Security 
Dialogue.  Liotta emphasizes the increasing need for inter-agency cooperation and that 
military capability will often provide supporting roles to a variety of national 
vulnerabilities, but primarily in the arena of homeland security (2002).   
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II. THE MILITARY/INTELLIGENCE SCHEMA AND MILITARY 
COMMISSIONS VS. ARTICLE III COURTS 
This chapter seeks to set the stage for the debate concerning areas that directly 
affect the use of information obtained outside of traditional law enforcement, and that 
provide admissible evidence: the collection and handling of evidence, as it relates to the 
Federal Rules of Evidence; the manner in which terrorism subjects are arrested, 
subsequently detained and the information obtained from their interrogations, as it relates 
to due process; and the legal environments capable of utilizing and protecting sensitive or 
classified evidence, which can also provide a fair and transparent trial.  The evaluation of 
these areas is done with the understanding that the terrorism quandary and the threat it 
poses is no longer strictly a law enforcement affair.  The problem requires the application 
of multiple elements of national power and the blending of inherent capabilities from 
many national assets.  The chapter will demonstrate the differences that exist between 
traditional Article III and Military Commission forms of jurisprudence and the problems 
surrounding the use of classified evidence in those forums.  It also justifies a review of 
tools implemented by other democratic nations that can meet the homeland security 
requirements of the nation while providing a fair judicial process to meet an “endgame.” 
A. PROSECUTION AND THE NEED FOR EVIDENCE 
In a November 2001 Special Report for the U.S. Institute for Peace, author Dave 
Scheffer comments on the growing worldwide number of terrorist suspects.  Scheffer 
remarks that Usama bin Laden is one of 22 suspects, publicly listed as the “FBI’s Most 
Wanted Terrorists,” who were already indicted by U.S. federal courts prior to the 9/11 
attacks (2001). The shift to an offensive military and intelligence strategy along with the 
“prevention first” mantra has been a principal reason for the growing list of terrorist 
suspects ending up in custody.  The most dangerous operatives and senior planners 
receive the label of High Value Detainee (HVD) (Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence [ODNI], 2007).  As the debate on where and how terrorist subjects are tried 
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goes on, one fact remains clear: in order to try any detainee, regardless of the legal forum, 
the need for evidence is crucial to achieve a desired “endgame” conviction.  
In its broadest sense, evidence includes everything used to determine or 
demonstrate the validity of an allegation and is the means by which one fulfills the 
burden of proof.  Evidence is typically characterized in two forms: circumstantial 
evidence, or evidence that suggests truth and direct evidence, which directly proves truth.  
According to descriptions provided in the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence can be in 
a tangible form such as documents, hardware and material items or in ethereal forms such 
as oral testimony and scientific test results.  In the arena of U.S. criminal law, evidence is 
governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence and can come in both a classified and 
unclassified manner.  The requirement to present enough suitable direct and 
circumstantial evidence to meet the burden of proof against terrorist subjects within an 
approved legal framework is at the heart of this debate.  When a significant amount of the 
best evidence originates as classified intelligence information, and is precluded from use 
in Article III federal criminal courts due to current judicial procedure and rules of 
evidence, the U.S. runs a dire risk of not meeting the end game objective (Rosenzweig & 
Carafano, 2004).   
B. COLLECTION AND THE HANDLING OF INTELLIGENCE 
INFORMATION AS POTENTIAL EVIDENCE 
Many observers reason that the Federal Rules of Evidence applied in criminal 
cases would make it difficult or impossible for the government to present bona fide 
evidence in terrorism trials.  While others find these issues overstated, the authentication 
of physical evidence, referred to as “chain of custody,” and the unavailability of 
witnesses who may not be in a position to testify, are indeed legitimate concerns that can 
determine the success of achieving an end game prosecution (Zabel & Benjamin, 2008).  
The aftermath of 9/11 and U.S. effort to combat the modern day terrorist threat 
have presented new dynamics that have forced the government to adapt to a shifting and 
complex homeland security challenge. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, up to and 
including the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole, the response to terrorism was largely a 
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traditional reactive law enforcement effort.  The collection of evidence by sworn federal 
agents during a post blast investigation followed the traditional lines of criminal 
procedure and rules of evidence.  Strict handling and thorough documentation of where 
evidence was recovered, who “seized” the evidence, along with a verifiable chain-of-
custody, are the expected standards of evidence handling in Article III courts.  A 
permissive secure environment affords the benefit of time and allows federal agents to 
“process” a crime scene in a manner that permits the attention to detail that has come to 
be expected.   
However, one of the new dynamics is that most of the senior level Al Qaeda 
leaders, planners and operatives are situated overseas in lawless ungoverned areas such as 
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA) or East Africa in Somalia—
out of reach of law enforcement capabilities.  The introduction of military and 
intelligence forces to disrupt and capture high value Al Qaeda leaders has proven 
effective, as evidenced by the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, Abu Faraj Al-Libi 
and Riduan bin Isomuddin Hambali (DefenceLink, 2009).   
Military and intelligence operatives historically have been well versed and 
capable in the collection of intelligence data but do not possess the inherent skills on 
collecting and handling intelligence data in an evidentiary manner. Rand Corporation 
author and former CIA analyst Bruce Berkowitz (2003) explains that while the collection 
of evidence for law enforcement purposes and intelligence collection may resemble each 
other, they can differ substantially.  Evidence collection traditionally aims to meet a 
specific legal standard such as “probable cause” or “beyond a reasonable doubt,” with the 
supposition of seeking a conviction in a court of law.  Conversely, intelligence rarely tries 
to prove anything. Its main purpose is to inform officials and military commanders in 
order to facilitate the decision making process (Berkowitz, 2003).  Berkowitz also 
confirms that “the clock runs differently” for law enforcement investigators as opposed to 
intelligence analysts.  Intelligence analysts go to work before a crisis, operating against 
the clock, while investigators usually go to work after a crime and can be more 
methodical and detailed in their approach (Berkowitz, 2003).  Figure 1 provides a visual 
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depiction of how intelligence and evidence, though traditionally divergent, do have a 
















Figure 1.   Intelligence/Evidence Value Innovation Chart 
In the execution of the counterterrorism mission, this new dynamic has placed a 
separate onus on military and intelligence personnel to function in a manner in which 
they are not inherently designed or trained.  Since the invasion of Afghanistan, military 
forces, particularly special operations units, have made significant improvement in their 
ability to conduct what is termed as “sensitive site exploitation” or SSE (Howard, 2009). 
SSE is defined as a series of activities inside a sensitive site captured from an adversary, 
the activities exploit personnel, documents, electronic data, and material captured at the 
site, while neutralizing any threat posed by the site or its contents (Galve, 2009).  SSE 
can best be described as the military/intelligence equivalent of a law enforcement search 
warrant precipitated by the arrest or attempted arrest of a subject.  U.S. Navy Captain 
Wyman Howard,6 a veteran of hundreds of counterterrorism special operations missions, 
expressed that the execution of SSE by special operations units, while it has evolved 
significantly, it needs to be further enhanced and standardized (2009).  Howard expressed 
                                                 
6 The views expressed by CAPT Howard are his own and do not represent the Office of the Secretary 
of Defence nor Special Operations Command. 
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the need to resolve how to transition the targeting of High Value Detainees to the Article 
III process.  How can the U.S. counterterrorism community transition the intelligence 
material captured during an SSE to useful evidence for prosecutive end game (Howard, 
2009)?  While the improvement of specialized DoD units in this field is commendable, it 
does not mitigate other considerations, such as testimony in a judicial forum.  The 
collection and handling issue is multi-faceted and can be complex even in a traditional 
criminal, non-combat scenario.   
An example of the issue at hand can be shown by the October 2001 arrest of 
former Guantanamo Bay detainee, Salim Ahmed Hamdan.  Hamdan was convicted by 
Military Commission on June 8, 2008, of material support to commit terrorism by acting 
as the driver for Usama Bin Laden (Markon, 2008).  Hamdan was returning from the 
Afghanistan/Pakistan border when he was stopped and apprehended by U.S. and Afghan 
Special Forces.  Found in his possession was a box of documents, photographs and 
passports.  The military personnel involved in his arrest, not understanding evidence 
recovery techniques, the rules of evidence or chain-of-custody did not collect the 
information in Hamden’s possession in a manner that would provide accurate 
accountability.  Nor did they establish who among the group initially seized the 
information or arrested Hamdan.  The documents in Hamdan’s possession were handled 
by a number of different individuals before being transported to the U.S. Embassy in 
Islamabad, Pakistan.  Once at the U.S. Embassy, the documents were provided to the FBI 
Assistant Legal Attaché, who boxed them up and sent them to FBI headquarters in 
Washington DC (Al-Bahlul, 2008).  
Since the commencement of military operations in 2001, the training, tactics and 
operating procedures for SSE have significantly improved within the special operations 
community.  As described by Howard (2009), “it is now executed in a very deliberate and 
precise manner.”  Special Operations’ execution of SSE has risen to an exceptional level 
and is accomplished in an intrinsic manner that fills the requirement for intelligence 
collection.  However, it is not a traditionally inherent special operations skill set as it 
relates to evidence collection and handling (Howard, 2009).  
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Among the documents confiscated from Hamdan was a small black notebook that 
contained a treasure trove of intelligence information on a number of Al Qaeda 
operatives to include Al Qaeda chem/bio scientist Yazid Sufaat (Charles, 2008; 
GlobalSecurity.org, 2009).  When the notebook was sent for fingerprint analysis by the 
FBI, it returned with a positive match for convicted Guantanamo detainee Ali Hamza Al-
Bahlul (Al Bahlul, 2008).  These items were key pieces of evidence in securing the 
convictions of Hamdan and Al Bahlul in their 2008 Military Commission trials.  These 
items will be just as critical in the anticipated Military Commission trials of other Al 
Qaeda detainees.  However, this evidence was nearly thrown out by the Military 
Commission judge due to the lack of certainty of who originally arrested Hamdan and 
seized these crucial documents.  Had the trial been in Federal Article III Court, it is very 
unlikely these documents would have survived based on the lack of authentication and a 
certifiable chain-of-custody.  Sufaat, who was arrested by Malay authorities on December 
12, 2001, and held for seven years under their Internal Security Act, was released from 
prison on December 12, 2008.  Should the U.S. be compelled to prosecute Sufaat for his 
involvement in providing material support to Al Qaeda, the damning evidence contained 
in the notebook may be suppressed for another reason.  While it is possible in legal 
proceedings for military personnel and intelligence officers’ identities to remain 
protected, it is not always guaranteed.  As stated by Howard, “there are genuine concerns 
with having operators testify, it may be possible in select cases but we should consider 
other options to achieve the desired outcome” (2009).  It is also not uncommon for 
intelligence and even law enforcement officers from key nations to be forbidden to testify 
for fear of political backlash for cooperation with the U.S.   
On January 22, 2009, President Barrack Obama signed an executive order to close 
down the Guantanamo Bay detention facility in one year’s time while also declaring a 
suspension of the Military Commission trials (Henry & Starr, 2009).  In September 2009, 
the administration requested its third continuance of Commission trials while seeking the 




U.S. (Finn, 2009).  Regardless of the judicial venue to be utilized in seeking convictions 
of these subjects, the evidence needed to achieve convictions must be available and 
admissible to meet the “endgame.”    
C. CAPTURE, DETENTION, HABEAS CORPUS, AND INTERROGATION 
In his 2006 book, War by Other Means, former Bush Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General and Berkley Law Professor, John Yoo, articulates the unique and unprecedented 
nature of the Al Qaeda enemy.  Yoo exclaims, “Al Qaeda is a covert network with no 
territory to defend, no civil population to protect and no standing military to attack.  Al 
Qaeda launches surprise attacks on purely civilian targets” (2006).  Emphasizing the 
imperative to prevent future 9/11 type attacks, Yoo states that the only way to achieve 
this objective is by acquiring intelligence.  He further asserts the best intelligence is 
obtained from the interrogation of captured Al Qaeda leaders and operatives (Yoo, 2006).   
Underscoring Yoo’s assertion is the March 2002 capture of senior Al Qaeda 
operative Abu Zubaydah.  Zubaydah, one of the planners of the failed 2000 millennium 
attacks (Department of Defense [DoD], 2007), possessed vital knowledge of the identities 
of hundreds of Al Qaeda terrorists and the networks in which they operated (Yoo, 2006).  
The information gleaned from Zubaydah’s capture and interrogation led to the capture of 
9/11 co-conspirator Ramzi Bin Al-Shib that followed six months later with the major 
coup in the capture of the 9/11 mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM) (Yoo, 
2006).  The capture, interrogation and intelligence from these key players, particularly 
from Mohammad, not only eliminated significant parts of the Al Qaeda hierarchy but also 
directly disrupted planned attacks against U.S. based targets and foreign allies (McNeill 
& Carafano, 2009; Yoo, 2006).   
The capture, detention and interrogation of Zubaydah, Bin Al-Shib and KSM 
were outside the parameters of the traditional law enforcement format.  All three were 
captured overseas with the assistance of a foreign intelligence agency and the reported 
involvement of specialized U.S. units (Shane, 2008).  As HVDs, they were detained 
without appearing before a magistrate, charged with a criminal offense, and questioned 
without the legal representation.  Each was considered an enemy combatant who had 
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violated the laws of war and as such, they were not entitled to the protections afforded by 
the Third Geneva Convention.  It is reasonable to believe that had each been subject to 
traditional legal due process, the intelligence obtained from them to meet the first 
objective, the prevention of terrorist attacks, would have been significantly degraded or 
all together unlikely. In an article for the New York Times, author Scott Shane informs 
that KSM, following his March 2003 capture in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, told his 
interrogators he would only consider cooperating once he was flown to New York and 
provided a lawyer. KSM was savvy to U.S. jurisprudence having learned from the arrest 
and extradition of his nephew, Ramzi Yousef, the architect of the 1993 World Trade 
Center Bombing (Shane, 2008).  
The Fourth Amendment is intended to protect against “arbitrary arrests and 
unreasonable searches” absent a warrant or probable cause.7  A subject detained without 
a warrant is entitled to a prompt, non-adversarial hearing before a magistrate to provide a 
fair and reliable determination of probable cause in order to keep the detained subject in 
custody (FindLaw, 2009).  The Supreme Court has interpreted a “prompt” hearing as 
being within 48 hours in order to make the determination of probable cause (Gernstein v. 
Pugh, 1975; County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 1991).  The Fifth Amendment, 
commonly known as the due process amendment, states a subject shall not be made to be 
a witness against himself and may not be “deprived of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law (FindLaw, 2009).  The Supreme Court has interpreted that the right to 
due process has “substantive” and “procedural” aspects.  Substantive due process 
prevents the government from detaining a person prior to the judgment of guilt in a 
criminal trial. Government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or property endures 
substantive due process scrutiny; it must still be applied in a fair manner, referred to as 
“procedural” due process (U.S. v Salerno, 1987).  These amendments support the writ of 
habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus is a judicial mandate requiring that a prisoner be 
brought before the court to determine whether the government has the right to continue 
                                                 
7  Probable cause is a reasonable belief that a person has committed a crime. The test the court employs 
to determine whether probable cause existed for purposes of arrest is whether facts and circumstances 
within the officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe a suspect has 
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. U.S. v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 
1992).  
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their detention. The individual being held or their representative can petition the court for 
such a writ.  The Fifth Amendment also affords protection against self incrimination 
whereby in Miranda v Arizona, the Supreme Court's interpretation resulted in what is 
famously known as the Miranda warning. The Supreme Court summarized:  
The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or 
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless 
it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the 
privilege against self-incrimination. (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966) 
The court proceeded to define custodial interrogation as, “questioning initiated by 
law enforcement officers after a subject has been deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way” (Miranda v Arizona, 1966). The court further stated that the procedural 
safeguard of warning the subject of his right to remain silent and to the presence of an 
attorney must be conducted prior to any questioning or the government risks summary 
dismissal of the case (Miranda v Arizona, 1966).  Additionally:  
if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish 
to be interrogated, he may not be questioned.  Despite the fact the subject 
may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements does 
not deprive him of the right of refrain from answering  further questions 
until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be 
questioned. (Miranda v Arizona, 1966) 
From his statement to interrogators, KSM assumed he was entitled to these same 
legal substantive and procedural safeguards (Shane, 2008).  The debate between civil 
libertarians and the national security community centers on how much, if any, those like 
KSM should be afforded the rights and protections typical in criminal due process. Many 
civil libertarians have argued as much.  Some, such as Richard Zabel and James 
Benjamin of Human Rights First, contend that the applicability of Miranda is null if the 
subject is detained and questioned overseas by foreign officials and the statements are 
given voluntarily.  However, in the 1998 Embassy Bombings case, the presiding judge 
broke new ground by declaring that when, “U.S. law enforcement questions a detained 
suspect overseas, the U.S. officers must administer a variant of the Miranda warnings 
even though the questioning is occurring outside the United States” (Zabel & Benjamin, 
2008).  This was in reference to one of the bombers, Daoud Al-’Owhali, who bailed from 
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the explosive laden truck in the final minute.  Following his arrest, Al-’Owhali was 
interrogated by FBI agents while in the custody of Kenyan authorities. Statements by Al-
’Owalhi in Kenya prior to his being fully apprised regarding his right to have a lawyer 
present during questioning were suppressed, but statements he made following the 
application of modified Miranda were ruled admissible (Zabel & Benjamin, 2008).  Zabel 
and Benjamin do admit that there are few who have been on trial following being 
captured on the battlefield and there is no means to substantiate how the courts would 
perceive Miranda under those conditions.  This is not withstanding what now defines the 
battlefield which many now contend extends beyond the traditional parameters of a “front 
line” and lawful uniformed military combatants.   
The capture, detention and interrogation of terrorism subjects are a critical piece 
to the admissibility of critical evidence.  KSM demonstrated his intent to shield himself 
from interrogation and perhaps even challenge the legality of his arrest by demanding to 
be taken to the U.S. and provided legal representation.  If the U.S. government submitted 
to this maneuver it would be highly disruptive to the intelligence collection process and 
seriously degrade meeting the objective of prevention.  KSM was not provided a Miranda 
warning nor was his detention evaluated before a magistrate within 48 hours to determine 
probable cause for his arrest.  He was not permitted to petition a writ of habeas corpus.  
KSM was questioned at length and under what many consider harsh and coercive 
methods.8  While the arrest and interrogation of KSM, and the other HVDs, meets the 
first objective of prevention, this only addresses one part of the problem. Preventing 
HVDs from rejoining the fight and successful prosecution that results in the long-term 
elimination of the threat posed are the other two sides of the triad.   
In this asymmetric, unconventional conflict, should the ability to effectively 
prosecute a terror subject be acutely jeopardized when the manner of arrest, prolonged 
detention, and information obtained come from outside of traditional criminal due 
process yet meet laws of war legality?  If defeating the modern day terrorism threat 
requires the blending of military, intelligence and law enforcement capabilities, shouldn’t 
                                                 
8 Though the methods of enhanced interrogation have also become a serious cause for concern 
regarding evidence admissibility, this unique issue is outside the scope of this thesis.   
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the U.S. also seek to blend and construct a constitutionally acceptable legal means of 
arresting, detaining and interrogating terrorism subjects?  Examining the issue of 
preventative detention as practiced in other Democracies such as the U.K. and Israel 
while exploring the French judicial construct for potential solutions will be addressed 
later in this thesis. 
D. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE OF THE MILITARY COMMISSION 
PROCESS 
The success of the post 9/11 military and intelligence scheme has clearly been 
demonstrated with the thwarting of over 23 plots (McNeill & Carafano, 2009).  However, 
criticism regarding aspects pertaining to the capture, detention and interrogation of 
terrorist subjects persists as the pendulum now swings away from a military centric 
stratagem.  On 18 September 2001, the Congress provided, “The Authorization for Use of 
Military Force (AUMF)” against those responsible for the attacks launched against the 
United States on 11 September 2001 (Pub L. 107-40, 2001).  This action significantly 
changed the manner in which the U.S. would deal with terrorism.  Consequently, the 
Bush administration declared the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and brought U.S. 
military might to bear on Al Qaeda and their Taliban hosts in Afghanistan.   
As in all previous wars fought by the U.S., prisoners were taken and those 
believed to be associated specifically with Al Qaeda were considered the most valuable 
but also the most controversial.  Should Al Qaeda prisoners be considered “prisoners of 
war” (POW) and afforded the rights and protections as outlined under the Third Geneva 
Convention?  Or are Al Qaeda captives arrested criminals who are afforded the rights of 
due process and habeas corpus?  Or do they legally fall into a third category as “enemy 
combatants?”  As enemy combatants, they are not entitled to Geneva protections, 
traditional criminal due process. In addition, they can be subject to prolonged detention, 
interrogation and trial by military commission.  
The first part of the debate concerns whether captured Al Qaeda members are 
prisoners of war or enemy combatants.  In November 2001, President Bush issued The 
Military Order of November 13, 2001.  This order declared:  
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To protect the United States and its citizens, and for the effective conduct 
of military operations and prevention of terrorist attacks, it is necessary for 
individuals subject to this order pursuant to section 2 be detained, and, 
when tried, to be tried for violations of the laws of war and other 
applicable laws by military tribunal. (Military Order, 2001) 
President Bush, advised by the Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, 
further declared in a February 7, 2002 White House memorandum:  
None of the provisions of Geneva apply to the conflict with Al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world because, among other 
reasons, 1) Al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party to Geneva; 2) 
Common Article 3 of Geneva does not apply to either Al Qaeda or Taliban 
detainees, because the relevant conflicts are international in scope and 
common Article 3 applies only to “armed conflict not of an international 
character.” 3)  Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants and, therefore, 
do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva and because 
Geneva does not apply to the conflict with Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda detainees 
also do not qualify as prisoners of war [emphasis added]. (White House, 
2002)  
The administration further stipulated that even if Geneva applied, Al Qaeda was 
required to obey four principles in order to receive POW status; 1) Operate under a 
responsible command; 2) Wear uniforms; 3) Carry their weapons openly; 4) Obey the 
laws of war (Yoo, 2006). According to Yoo, since it is apparent Al Qaeda has never 
followed any of these tenets and seeks to deliberately break the laws of armed conflict, Al 
Qaeda further sacrificed any claim to POW status.   
Obstinately, many, such as the late University of Washington Law professor Joan 
Fitzpatrick (2002), argued that the Bush administration’s decision to deny POW status to 
captured Al Qaeda was “contemptuous of international law.”  Fitzpatrick claimed the 
denial of POW status violated Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention, which requires 
a “competent tribunal” to determine whether any “persons, having committed a 
belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy,” qualify as prisoners of 
war.  Fitzpatrick stated that members of militias and organized resistance movements can 
qualify as POWs under defined circumstances; hence, some Al Qaeda members captured 
during fighting in Afghanistan may also be entitled to presumptive POW status (2002).   
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At the heart of the debate is how POWs are handled as opposed to those 
designated as enemy combatants.  Under Part 1, Article 3 and Part 3, Article 17 of the 
Third Geneva Convention, lawful combatants detained by the opposing force cannot be 
subject to interrogation (Geneva, 1949). As stated in Part 3, Article 17, “Every prisoner 
of war, when questioned, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of 
birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent 
information” (Geneva, 1949).  Part I, Article 3 states, “The passing of sentences must 
also be pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees 
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples” (Geneva, 1949).   
If Al Qaeda has forfeited any claim to POW status, as designated as enemy 
combatants, the government possesses increased flexibility in detention and interrogation 
to obtain actionable intelligence that could disrupt attacks and lead to the capture of other 
Al Qaeda operatives (Yoo, 2006).  The enemy combatant designation also made captured 
Al Qaeda detainees subject to the military commissions established by President Bush in 
the November 13, 2001 Military Order.  As described by Yoo, military commissions have 
a long and tested history having been utilized by Presidents and generals in virtually 
every American war.  Military commissions are specialized military courts that 
supporters claim are able to balance providing a fair and transparent trial for enemies who 
commit violations of the laws of war while protecting the nation’s military and 
intelligence interests (Yoo, 2006).   
Opponents of Military Commissions such as Harvard and Georgetown law 
professors Laurence Tribe and Neal Kaytal have litigated against commissions as being 
unconstitutional, absent a formal declaration of war and explicit congressional 
authorization via statute (Kaytal & Tribe, 2002). The claim to the differences in judicial 
procedure and evidentiary standards compared to Article III and Court Marital make 
commissions unconstitutional.  These assertions were bolstered by the Supreme Court’s 
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2006 ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.9  Other opponents, such as Fitzpatrick, the Century 
Foundation’s Stephen Schulofer and University of Houston International Law Professor 
Jordan Paust, exclaim commissions violate international law as it relates to the Geneva 
Conventions.  As stated by Paust:  
When there is an international armed conflict, certain persons, such as 
enemy combatants who are members of the armed forces of a party to the 
conflict, are entitled to prisoner of war (POW) status and protections under 
Article 4 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War (GPW). Membership in the armed forces is the 
determining criterion, yet prisoners of war can simply be detained during 
an armed conflict.  During an armed conflict, all persons who are not 
prisoners of war, including so-called unprivileged or unlawful combatants 
who may or may not have POW status, have at least some non-derogable 
rights to due process under the Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Civilian 
Convention or GC) and Geneva Protocol I. (2003) 
However, proponents will argue military commissions have centuries of practice, 
are buoyed by the Constitution and supported by Supreme Court precedent.  
Commissions were first utilized by General Washington during the revolution and most 
extensively during the Civil War and World War II.  From a Constitutional aspect, 
President Bush’s authority to establish commissions was based on, “the commander-in- 
chief powers provided by the Constitution, including the power to wage wars that 
Congress has declared” (Evans, 2002).  Proponents point to the September 2001 AUMF 
by Congress as the equivalent of a war declaration against a non-state organization such 
as Al Qaeda.  Further supported by the congressionally approved Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ), Article 21 asserts that military commissions have “concurrent 
jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may 
be tried by military commissions... or other military tribunals” (10 U.S.C. 821, 2000). 
Thus as the commander-in-chief, the president can establish military commissions to try 
and punish those who have committed violations of the laws of war (Evans, 2002).   
                                                 
9 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). On June 29, 2006, the Court issued a 5-3 decision holding 
that it had jurisdiction that the administration did not have authority to set up these particular military 
commissions without congressional authorization because they did not comply with the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice and the Geneva Convention which the court found to be incorporated into the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice. 
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During the Civil War and reconstruction period, commissions tried in excess of 
2000 cases, most notably those associated with the assassination of President Lincoln 
(Yoo, 2006).  The Supreme Court has heard some of the most significant challenges to 
commissions beginning with the civil war decision in Ex Parte Vallandigham where the 
Court held it did not have the jurisdiction to hear challenges to sentences imposed by 
military commission (Ex Parte Vallandigham, 1863).  In Ex Parte Milligan, the Court 
held that military commissions could not try civilians in areas where civil courts were 
open and the accused did not associate with the enemy (Ex Parte Milligan, 1866).  
However, inherent in the decision is that if Milligan had not been considered a civilian 
but an unlawful combatant, he would be subject to the jurisdiction of military 
commissions for violations of the laws of war.  This is supported by a federal court’s 
decision in Ex Parte Mudd where the challenge for the use of commissions regarding 
those tried for the Lincoln assassination was rejected (Ex Parte Mudd, 1868).   
The most significant Supreme Court ruling was the 1942 Ex Parte Quirin, which 
upheld President Roosevelt’s authority to establish commissions during WWII. Quirin 
dealt with eight Nazi saboteurs who infiltrated the U.S. intent on committing hostile 
actions while disguised as civilians. The saboteurs were arrested by the FBI and, at the 
recommendation of Attorney General Francis Biddle, President Roosevelt convened 
special military commissions in July 1942.  Quirin sought to challenge the 
constitutionality of the commissions when the federal courts were open and available 
(Evans, 2002). The Court held: 
The Constitution does not require that offenses against the law of war be 
tried before a jury. The detention and trial of petitioners ordered by the 
President in the declared exercise of his powers as Commander-in-Chief 
in time of war and of grave public danger are not to be set aside by the 
courts without the clear conviction that they are in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States [emphasis added]. (Ex Parte 
Quirin, 1942)    
While opponents will argue the military commissions established by President 
Bush are unconstitutional because they were not authorized by Congress, neither were 
those used by Roosevelt during WWII.  Proponents state the Supreme Court relied on 
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Article 15 of Congress’s 1916 overhaul of the Articles of War, which remains as part of 
the UCMJ (Yoo, 2006).  In response to the Hamdan decision, Congress passed the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), which according to Yoo, “was a stinging 
rebuke to the Supreme Court in its attempt to take over terrorism policy” (2006).  The 
MCA provided Congress’s approval for the establishment of military commissions while 
stripping the courts of jurisdiction to hear any habeas corpus claim filed by any alien 
enemy combatant anywhere in the world (United States Military Commissions Act, 
2006).  
Establishing the affirmative Constitutional and legal standing of Military 
Commissions is critical when contemplating the manner in which terrorist subjects will 
be brought to justice.  Article III courts impose a very high and rigid standard regarding 
the evidence that can be presented to a jury.  The judicial procedures such as Miranda 
warnings and the use of search warrants to obtain evidence are meant to control police 
behavior and have less to do with the credibility of evidence.  Equally relevant is a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to call witnesses in his defence and face the 
witnesses and evidence against him.  These standards are high because the cost to society 
by allowing a criminal to go free due to police or prosecutor malfeasance is relatively low 
when compared to the rights prescribed in the Bill of Rights.  However, in times of armed 
conflict it can be argued that these rules do not apply to the enemy since the primary 
purpose in war is to defeat the enemy.  The rules of military commissions are less rigid 
than those of Article III courts, mainly due to the nature of combat operations, the means 
by which intelligence information is obtained and the manner in which enemies are 
captured.  The inherent flexibility of commission rules permits for the use of hearsay 
testimony, evidence obtained without warrants and unmirandized statements by the 
accused.  Furthermore, commission proceedings can be closed and the subject excluded 
to protect classified sources, methods and information.  
In dealing with this modern asymmetrical threat in which technology has made it 
possible for previously isolated non-state actors to threaten the existence of society, the 
consideration of a modified judicial process fashioned within a constitutional framework 
must be considered.  Many legal scholars such as Carafano (2006), Rishikof (2003, 2007) 
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and Rivkin (2007) have advocated for a new national security court, which they claim 
can better meet the demand of the current blended military, intelligence and law 
enforcement effort.  Others have pointed to the fact that since military commissions can 
only be narrowly applied in times of declared conflict against specific actors, they limit 
the compromise between national security and civil liberties.  As argued by Yoo, military 
commissions possess a civil libertarian function by insulating the flexible rules allowed in 
commissions from bleeding over into civilian courts and potentially threatening domestic 
criminal law during peacetime (2006).  In the course of seeking an “endgame” solution 
for terrorist detainees, the venue and the applicable rules must meet both constitutional 
thresholds and national security requirements concerning the inclusion of all evidence to 
the greatest extent possible. 
E. THE CURRENT TOOLS FOR PROTECTING CLASSIFIED EVIDENCE: 
CIPA, MRE 505 AND MCA 2006 
The debate on Military Commissions versus Article III courts is the segue to an 
evaluation of how classified information is currently protected in Federal Court.  As 
discussed by New York University (NYU) Law School professors Serrin Turner and 
Stephen Schulhofer, a principal concern with prosecuting accused terrorists in Article III 
courts is the court’s ability to adequately protect secret information vital to the 
counterterrorism effort. Conversely, the main objection to military commissions has been 
that secret and un-refuted evidence can play a major part in unfairly depriving a 
defendant of Sixth Amendment rights to confront the evidence against him, to obtain 
evidence in his favour, and be tried in a public proceeding (Turner & Schulhofer, 2005).  
Department of Justice senior litigation counsel, John De Pue (2009), has stated that 
constitutional mandates apply to all evidentiary material, meaning that the government is 
obligated to produce not just incriminating evidence but also evidence that can be 
considered exculpatory such as Brady or Jenks material.  The problem typically is not the 
material itself, but the means by which is it acquired, and if the disclosure of that material 
would expose and compromise highly sensitive sources, techniques or on-going 
operations (De Pue, 2009). 
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The Classified Information Protection Act (CIPA), and its military equivalent, 
Military Rules of Evidence 505 (MRE 505), were both enacted by Congress in 1980.  
CIPA affords the government in Article III courts the ability to substitute a summary of 
classified documents in lieu of the documents themselves, or submit a statement 
declaring facts that the documents would be apt to prove.  The intent is to permit a 
criminal prosecution to proceed without the defendant or his counsel ever seeing the 
actual classified documents.  MRE 505 largely mirrors CIPA and similarly permits the 
government to use substitution procedures in court-martial proceedings (Harvard Law, 
2005).   
Proponents contend the government possesses a number of options for dealing 
with classified evidence that is potentially relevant to the prosecution of a terrorism 
suspects.  Two are defined as “filtering” and “restricted disclosure.”  Utilizing the 
mechanisms in CIPA, “filtering” attempts to edit out classified information in order to 
regulate any disclosure in a criminal case.  CIPA filtering attempts to mitigate, though 
they do not eliminate , the risk of the government having to either disclose the classified 
material or dismiss the most serious charges, if not the entire case (Turner & Schulhofer, 
2005).  Restricted disclosure involves the federal court’s ability to limit disclosure of 
classified information only to specified persons such as cleared counsel during discovery.  
Furthermore, the court can restrict public access to proceedings when classified evidence 
will be presented.  However, even Turner and Schulhofer concede that these procedural 
tools are underdeveloped and not formalized in statute (2005). 
As stated by De Pue (2009) and supported by Schulhofer (2005), the greatest test 
and burden concerning classified information is not necessarily the evidence presented at 
trial but the discovery obligation encumbered by the prosecution.  When considering a 
discovery request by the defence, the courts employ a two-part test to determine if the 
classified information itself is: 1) Relevant to the case, 2) Whether it would be helpful to 
the defense.  If the classified information meets these criteria and is deemed discoverable, 
the burden shifts to the government to show why modification or substitution of the 
documents is necessary.  If the government’s substitution is not deemed sufficient to  
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adequately meet its discovery obligation, the government must either release the 
information in its original form or face penalty that may include dismissal of specific 
charges or the entire prosecution (Harvard Law, 2005). 
Proponents of CIPA stand by the premise that the military commission process, 
created specifically to protect classified evidence, should be abandoned due to the 
commission rules lacking appropriate safeguards to ensure transparency and protect from 
open-ended government discretion in keeping secret evidence from a defendant (Turner 
& Schulhofer, 2005).  They further argue the federal courts already possess, in CIPA, the 
tools needed for protecting classified evidence while supporting the adversarial system 
(2005).  Schulhofer attempts to bolster this point by stating CIPA has demonstrated its 
capability in protecting classified information during the successful terrorism convictions 
of Ramzi Yousef for the first World Trade Center bombing, Ahmed Rassem, the 
millennium bomber, Richard Reid the Shoe Bomber and Zacarious Moussaoui for the 
9/11 conspiracy (2008). 
While the application of CIPA in terrorism trials has shown to be somewhat 
effective, critics and supporters alike acknowledge that it has its limitations.  CIPA, as 
argued by Harvard Law’s James Boeving (2007), was designed to address the problem of 
prosecuting Cold War spies for espionage.  Typically, an espionage defendant, a U.S. 
government employee or contractor, would attempt to “graymail” the government into 
abandoning the charges by threatening to reveal classified information the defendant had 
access to in connection with his job or necessary for his defense (Boeving, 2007). Critics 
argue the legal aspects of the war on terrorism present significant differences and 
concerns regarding the disclosure of classified information for which CIPA was not 
designed.  Critics state that CIPA’s legislative intent is inconsistent in regards to 
terrorism and makes its application, in a broader spectrum of terrorism trials, inadequate 
to protecting U.S. national security interests (Boeving, 2007).  Furthermore, no 
established body of law currently details the means by which CIPA should be applied to 
terrorism trials.  
As an example, in the terrorism trial of Moussaoui, federal judge Leonie 
Brinkema ruled that the discovery provision of CIPA only applied to the documentary 
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classified evidence and could not apply to prospective deposed testimony of HVDs not 
yet reviewed by the court (U.S. v Moussaoui, 2003).  The consequence was the 
government having to drop the conspiracy charges relating to 9/11 and abandonment of 
the death penalty.  A subjective look at many of the terrorism cases, which proponents 
sight as CIPA success, such as Reid, Moussaoui and Lindh resulted in the subjects 
pleading guilty without CIPA being fully tested.  While there have been a number of 
cases where the government has been able to declassify information, critics have argued 
the crux of the problem is not what the government can declassify but what it cannot and 
CIPA’s inability to protect the core sources and methods used to acquire that information. 
Modelled after CIPA, MRE 505 provides the government with a similar privilege 
against disclosure of classified information by allowing for the substitution to protect 
classified information in military court-martial proceedings (Harvard Law, 2005).  In 
response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hamdan v Rumsfeld, Congress passed the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006. In the MCA, Congress rejected the limited exclusion 
of the defendant from portions of the proceedings. The MCA requires that “the accused 
shall be present at all sessions of the military commission” and allows exclusion only 
under narrow confines of disruptive behavior. Rather than permit the exclusion of the 
accused from proceedings, the MCA seeks to protect classified evidence by incorporating 
procedures modeled after those in MRE 505 (Boeving, 2007).   
However, perhaps recognizing limitations in MRE and the stipulation in the 
Military Order of 13 November 2001, that only non-U.S. citizens could be tried by 
Military Commission, the MCA unlike MRE, contain detailed provisions that seek to 
protect classified information.  The MCA contains specific provisions that allow for the 
protection of sources and methods.  This provision allows trial counsel, upon making an 
appropriate request, to present evidence to the commission without revealing the sources, 
methods, and activities of the United States.  The MRE contains no similar provision, 
underscoring the key difference in prosecuting U.S. military personnel in courts-martial 
and prosecuting terrorists in military commissions (Boeving, 2007).  Furthermore, the 
MCA has no provision granting the military judge the authority to compel disclosure of 
classified information.  A considerable contrast to both MRE 505 and CIPA, this 
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provision does not place the prosecutor in a predicament of being forced to disclose 
classified information or abandoning the case.  Perhaps the most important difference is 
that the MCA permits an in camera and ex parte review of trial counsel’s claim of 
privilege at any point of the proceeding and not just prior to the referral of the charges as 
in MRE.  As opposed to MRE 505, which provides for an in camera hearing, but not one 
conducted ex parte or outside the presence of the defendant, the provision is designed to 
prevent exposure of classified evidence from both public view and the defendant 
(Boeving, 2007).  Another significant advantage MCA provides is that the jury panel in 
commissions is cleared and able to review classified evidence or hear classified 
testimony.  A jury in an Article III or even courts-martial, with CIPA or MRE 505 
working in an ideal manner, cannot provide the equivalent level of safeguard regarding 
the disclosure of the sources and methods used to bring the classified evidence to trial. 
Many on both sides of the debate feel that CIPA and MRE 505 are functional but 
require legislative improvements.  Recommendations have been made to codify the use 
of CIPA in terrorism prosecutions, establish a standing pool of cleared defense counsel, 
and permit for the limited exclusion of the defendant at junctures where classified 
testimony must be entered.   
F. SUMMARY 
The U.S. is confronted with a considerable irregular threat from an amorphous 
enemy who wages a vicious form of criminal armed conflict.  The consequences of 
successful attacks in this paradigm have and will produce devastating affects on the 
social, economic and human fabric of the nation.  These consequences and the nature of 
the enemy and the manner in which they operate dictate that prevention of attacks must 
be the priority.  It also dictates that the U.S. must recognize the problem as not solely a 
military, intelligence or law enforcement problem, but a problem that lies within a seam 
requiring the application of all elements.  Such is the case, while the U.S. possess distinct 
rules and tools for dealing with criminal matters versus military matters, this problem 
necessitates finding a convergence of aggressive, effective and lawful means to capture, 
exploit and prosecute terrorist subjects.  The collection and use of intelligence 
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information meets the goal of preventing attacks.  The means of turning that intelligence 
information into useful evidence to meet the “endgame” is the hurdle that must be 
cleared.  The obstacles remain, and the following case studies will demonstrate the holes 
that exist in the Article III process, even in perceived successful convictions. 
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III. METHODOLOGY/CASE STUDIES 
Modern day conditions with the continuous advancement and access of 
technology has forced the U.S. to consider the demands the international threat 
environment places upon its national and homeland security.  More important is how the 
U.S. will adapt to meet these threats, prevent attacks, and convict those who mean to do 
the nation harm.  In 2008, at the direction of the Director of National Intelligence, the 
National Counterterrorism Center, Senior Inter-Agency Strategy Team proceeded to 
identify impediments to the National Implementation Plan for the War on Terrorism.  
One of those identified impediments is the facilitation of classified intelligence 
information as evidence in the prosecution of terrorism subjects (National 
Counterterrorism Center [NCTC], 2008).  This issue is multi-faceted and involves the 
debate of the suitability of Federal Article III courts versus Military Commissions.  It also 
involves the questioning the adequacy of the Classified Information Protection Act 
(CIPA), the need for a legal preventative detention regime of terrorism subjects to 
prevent attacks and allow for the use of their statements in court.  Finally, it includes the 
use of highly specialized classified military and intelligence units that are involved in the 
capture of terrorism subjects and evidentiary material.  
A. THE SELECTION OF THE PADILLA, AL-BAHLUL AND REID CASES 
Considering the threat and circumstances posed to the national and homeland 
security of the United States, a question that must be asked is:  Do the civilian Federal 
Article III courts meet the demands to effectively combat the modern day terrorism threat 
posed to U.S. national and homeland security?  Since 9/11, 28 terrorist plots have 
reportedly been disrupted (McNeill & Zuckerman, 2009).  Many of those involved, such 
as Najibullah Zazi, have yet to test their cases in court (Sheehan, 2009).  With the U.S. 
government’s recent controversial decision to try the cases of five Guantanamo Bay 




will be severely tested (Weber, 2009).  Some cases frequently cited as examples of 
success, such as Jose Padilla and Richard Reid, upon closer examination reveal flaws that 
can prove to be dangerous.   
In this regard, a case study analysis of former designated “enemy combatant,” 
Jose Padilla, who was prosecuted and convicted in Article III court; Ali Hamza Ahmad 
Suleiman Al-Bahlul, who was tried and convicted in a Military Commission at the U.S. 
Naval facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and examination of the Richard Reid case, who 
plead guilty in Article III court, will show the differences between the venues and 
demonstrate problems that exist and require adaptations or steps to be considered.  
Elements from Omar Abdel Rahman case are also introduced to emphasize particular 
points in specific areas as outlined in the previous paragraph.  The recent high profile 
case of Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab, the Christmas Day underwear bomber, is also 
examined to highlight the similarities with the Reid case and the corrective actions 
directed by the President as a result.  The variables that will be examined in these cases 
include 1) The charges brought against each subject; 2) The charges that were not 
brought due to issues dealing with classified information or the inability to produce 
witnesses at trial; 3) Amount of time each subject was held in a preventative detention 
situation and the results of intelligence obtained; 4) Length and severity of the sentences 
received.  
B. CASE STUDIES 
1. Padilla Case 
a. Key Takeaways 
1. Article III process was insufficient in meeting the threat posed by 
Padilla forcing the government to declare him an enemy combatant 
and abandoning charging him with more substantial terrorism 
offenses. The sentence imposed on Padilla did not meet his 
intended actions. 
2. Lack of a legal preventative detention regime forced the U.S. to 
designate Padilla an enemy combatant when no other option was 
available.  Statements made by Padilla while in a preventative 
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detention situation, which confirmed his intention to carry out 
terrorist attacks, were not admissible in Article III court. 
3. The use of hearsay statements by other detainees in preventative 
detention concerning Padilla was not admissible in Article III 
court. Classified intelligence gained from interrogations of Padilla 
while in preventative detention as an enemy combatant identified 
other Al Qaeda operatives, training, tactics, and procedures.   
4. The utility of CIPA, while functional, needs modification to 
protect classified information and obtain convictions. 
5. The involvement of special operations military and intelligence 
units in the terrorism conflict is problematic in the Article III 
setting. 
b. The U.S. Citizen Dirty Bomber 
Consider the following scenario: Intelligence sources reveal a plot by a 
terrorist organization operating in Afghanistan/Pakistan region.  The intelligence 
indicates that one of the terrorists is a U.S. citizen and is strongly linked to al-Qaeda.  The 
target of the plot is undetermined but is definitely in the United States, possibly on the 
West Coast or in Texas.  The plot is in motion, but it is unclear when it will happen, what 
form it will take, or whether the terrorists are in the United States or not.  Additional 
intelligence later determines the U.S. citizen has made plans to re-enter the U.S. in 
furtherance of this plot (Newman, 2002).  On 8 May 2002, Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen, 
whom intelligence sources clearly indicated was a member of Al Qaeda involved in a plot 
against the U.S. homeland, was arrested when his plane landed at O’Hare International 
airport in Chicago (Mukasey 2007).   
The clarity between national and homeland security versus criminal law 
enforcement can be murky at best.  Foreign intelligence operations, military operations 
and coordination with foreign nations along with domestic and international law 
enforcement all play critical and complicating roles in situations such as these (Newman 
2002).  In a 2007 editorial in the Wall Street Journal, former Attorney General, Michael 
Mukasey, distressingly points out that despite the intelligence information that indicated 
Padilla was strongly linked to senior Al Qaeda leadership and involved in a plot to 
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commit violent terrorist acts in the U.S. homeland, the FBI was not able to arrest him on 
any kind of criminal warrant due to the classified nature of the information.  Instead, the 
FBI had to utilize a century-old statute to secure a material witness warrant in order to 
detain Padilla and disrupt the operation.    
With no other legal means available, the government relied heavily on the 
outdated Material Witness statute following 9/11 because it did not possess in its arsenal 
any legal way to authorize investigative or preventative detention based on reasonable 
suspicion, much like what is available in Britain, Israel and France (Mukasey, 2007).  As 
Mukasey states, the material witness statute is inadequate for dealing with the serious 
perils of terrorism since it provides the government with insufficient time in which to 
have a subject, such as Padilla, be interrogated, testify before a grand jury and prosecuted 
or released.  In Padilla’s case, when that limited time ran out, the nature and substance of 
the information in the government’s possession made charging him impossible and 
releasing him unacceptable. The government withdrew the grand jury subpoena that 
triggered his designation as a material witness and instead designated Padilla as an 
“unlawful enemy combatant” (Mukasey, 2007).  Mukasey stipulates that the allegation 
Padilla was involved in a “Dirty Bomb Plot” and other assorted terrorist actions could not 
be proved without utilizing the “classified or hearsay evidence” needed to charge and 
prosecute him in an Article III court.  This resulted in Padilla becoming one of the first 
U.S. citizens in more than a century to be designated an enemy combatant (Mukasey, 
2007).    
Following a litany of appeals by attorneys representing Padilla, including 
one before Mukasey himself in 2002, while serving as a federal district court judge in the 
Southern District of New York, the government rescinded the enemy combatant 
designation and transferred Padilla from the custody of the Secretary of Defense to the 
Attorney General.  On 17 November 2005, Padilla was charged with; U.S.C. 18 § 956(a), 
Conspiracy to Murder, Kidnap, Maim Persons in a Foreign Country; U.S.C. 18 § 2339(a) 
Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists and U.S.C. 18 § 2339(b) Material 
Support to Terrorists (U.S. vs. Padilla, 2005).  Though conviction on these charges can  
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bring a maximum penalty of life in prison, there was heavy criticism of the government 
that none of the charges brought against Padilla involved conspiracy to commit terrorism 
in the U.S. homeland.   
In a 2007 article in the University of Virginia Law School Alumni 
Magazine (UVA Lawyer), FBI Special Agent John Kavanaugh suggests that the 
government in many ways got lucky in that the FBI had an on-going investigation on 
Ahmad Hassoun, a radical Islamic cleric in South Florida, who had been recruiting and 
fundraising for terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan beginning in the 1990s.  
One of Hassoun’s recruits was Padilla (Couch, 2007).  In a follow on interview, Special 
Agent Kavanaugh, an attorney prior to entering the FBI, clarifies that the government’s 
conspiracy prosecution of Hassoun fortunately provided an option to charge Padilla 
because he fit into the conspiracy. However absent this option, the disposition of Padilla 
was still undetermined.   
Kavanaugh (2009) indicated the government’s case against Padilla did not 
include any aspects of the “dirty bomb” or natural gas explosion plots due to the majority 
of the evidence coming from the interrogations of senior Al Qaeda and 9/11 planners Abu 
Zubaydah and  Khalid Sheik Mohammed.  The nature of the preventative detention and 
interrogation of Zubaydah, KSM and Padilla himself rendered this critical information 
inadmissible in Article III criminal courts (Kavanaugh, 2009).  Kavanaugh provided that 
the bulk of the evidence that would have been necessary to build substantial charges to 
commit terrorist attacks was not available due to the level of classification, Article III 
procedural rules dealing with hearsay and information coming from foreign governments 
(2009).  
However, as argued by the Heritage Foundation’s James Carafano 
(Carafano & Rosenzweig, 2004) and supported by DHS attorney Stephanie Blum (2008), 
the government’s priority to prevent terrorist attacks requires some means of preventative 
detention for interrogation and intelligence collection.  Though the government’s position 
of holding enemy combatants in preventative detention without limits has been criticized 
by many, including the Century Foundation’s Stephen Schulhofer (2009), as beyond 
reason and unlawful, this example substantiates the effectiveness and need for some form 
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of such a regime.  Without delving into the debate on interrogation techniques, the 
principal observation which must be made is that the information collected from 
Zubaydah, KSM, Padilla and others permitted the U.S. national and homeland security 
apparatus to identify and disrupt what could be considered a devastating and deadly 
terrorist attack within the U.S.  According to Kavanaugh, Padilla, in particular, did not 
divulge any information relating to his intent to carry out an attack while still in the 
custody of DOJ under the material witness warrant.  It was not until a longer period of 
time, and the application of a sustained interrogation approach, that Padilla corroborates 
what Zubaydah, KSM, and others had revealed to intelligence and military officials 
(Kavanaugh, 2009).  A supplementary point is the fact that both Zubaydah and KSM 
were held in preventative detention and provided crucial indentifying information on 
Padilla and his plot.   
A federal agent who spent significant time with Padilla while he was in 
DoD custody, described his interaction with Padilla as, “strictly for intelligence 
purposes,” with the understanding that any statements made by Padilla under his 
conditions of confinement would likely not be admissible in an Article III court.  
Nevertheless, the federal agent acknowledged that Padilla’s extended detention in DoD 
custody provided the opportunity to elicit a great volume of valuable and actionable 
intelligence. Utilizing a forensic and investigative approach that military interrogators 
were far less proficient, the federal agent was able to leverage the statements made by 
senior Al Qaeda detainees to get Padilla to not only confess to his intent to carry out a 
significant domestic terrorist attack but to also reveal critical information on fellow Al 
Qaeda operatives such as U.S. citizen Adnan El-Shukrijuma (Comey, 2004).  Padilla also 
made known his overseas activities, Al-Qaeda tactics, training and practices, in addition 
to his operational taskings.  One area of particular interest was how Al Qaeda recruited, 
trained and vetted a Hispanic American, allowing him to get next to the most senior 
levels of Al Qaeda leadership (federal agent (identity withheld), personal communication, 
August 4, 2009).  In addition, the federal agent described how Padilla’s past experience 
with the criminal justice system from his days as a gang member led him to believe he 
could “hold out” until the government provided him a hearing or an attorney.  As time 
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went on, when neither were provided, Padilla concluded this was not “business as usual” 
and that the only way out of his predicament was through cooperation with authorities  
(federal agent (identity withheld), personal communication, August 4, 2009). 
As Kavanaugh states (2009), Padilla happened to fall perfectly into the 
Hassoun case and was simply added as a co-conspirator.  However, despite the media and 
public perception of the case and trial, Padilla was not the main player.  Padilla was a 
much smaller fish, albeit a much more dangerous one.  In this regard, the government 
was extremely fortunate there were alternate criminal charges, albeit, less serious charges 
relative to what his intentions were, that could be brought at all against Padilla (Couch, 
2007).  Had this not been the case, the government may have had to let Padilla go free on 
the streets of the U.S. As stated by Kavanaugh, “this was not a case about what we knew 
but what we could prove in court with admissible evidence.  The Article III process 
would not allow us to utilize the information we needed to prove his terrorist conspiracy” 
(2009).  
Kavanaugh’s (2009) investigation of Hassoun reveals Padilla’s travel and 
attendance in the Al Farouq Al Qaeda training camp in 2000.  This was substantiated 
when a “mujahedeen application form” containing Padilla’s information was obtained by 
Special Operations/Intelligence personnel in Kandahar in 2001 (Couch, 2007).  This 
critical piece of evidence also presented its own set of unique problems.  Issues with the 
collection of evidence and chain of custody are standard Article III procedures.  
Typically, law enforcement personnel must be able to testify as to who the “seizing 
agent” was and how and where the evidence has been handled and stored.   
In 2001, when this document was collected in Afghanistan by superbly 
trained U.S. military forces, it was not recognized as a potential piece of damning 
evidence that would help convict a U.S. citizen jihadi.  At that time, it was key 
intelligence that identified someone who appeared to be Al Qaeda trained and had natural 
access to enter the U.S.  Exposing this information in public channels prior to positively 




him and driven him to ground.  For this reason among others, the application form, the 
information it contained and the specialized team that collected it made everything about 
it classified.  
In this case, the government was able to get this piece of information and 
six years of FISA telephone intercepts declassified for use. However, the introduction of 
Padilla’s Al Qaeda application recovered in Afghanistan was nearly derailed until a U.S. 
government intelligence agency allowed one of its officers to testify in disguise and not 
in true name (Kavanaugh, 2009).  According to Kavanaugh, the intelligence officer did 
testify as to his custody of the document, where it was recovered and that he had 
provided it to an FBI agent in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region.  Kavanaugh asserts that 
had the intelligence officer been required to testify about anything more substantive 
regarding his duties, contacts and methods, he would not have been in a position to 
disclose that information.  Under those circumstances, the judge could rule his entire 
testimony, including the training camp application, inadmissible (Kavanaugh, 2009).   
The extensive involvement of highly trained and secretive military special 
operations and intelligence units has brought about its own set of dilemmas.  The U.S. 
Special Operations Command (SOCOM), U.S. intelligence community (USIC) 
paramilitary units, and foreign intelligence services are very reluctant to expose the 
identities of their operatives.  In Article III courts, the prospect of these highly trained 
and heavily invested operatives having to publicly testify and risk exposing their 
identities is typically difficult to overcome.   
In the Padilla case, the judge and prosecution were able to make it work 
but only due to the very limited amount of testimony that was needed to demonstrate the 
authenticity and origination of where the document was found.  Certainly having an Al 
Qaeda training camp application containing Jose Padilla’s personal information was a 
very powerful piece of evidence in the minds of any jury.  Absent that convincing 
evidence, an element of doubt creeping into just one jury member could have set Padilla 
free.  Kavanaugh makes a compelling point, stating, “We should not be treating Al Qaeda 
documents recovered in a battlefield or inaccessible environments the same way we 
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would handle subpoenaed bank records.  Both are critical evidence but their origin and 
the means available by which we obtain them could not be more different” (2009).  
Kavanaugh explained that the use of CIPA, facilitated having the judge, 
Marcia Cooke, rule against the defense’s request to have a significant amount of 
classified information turned over for discovery requirements (2009).  In this instance, 
Kavanaugh stated that the government was fortunate the judge was not a justice who 
interprets the discovery rules in an excessively broad manner; however, her ruling on the 
inadmissibility of some classified evidence deemed hearsay is also the basis for the 
defense’s appeal (2009).  In this instance, the government was able to declassify a fair 
amount of information. However, classified information originating from a foreign 
government who does not want their cooperation with the U.S. to be made public, or 
exposing information that would reveal sensitive sources and methods is problematic and 
potentially damaging to a terrorism case such as Padilla’s.  Non-compliance with an order 
to declassify and make the information available to the defense would result in 
government having to abandon certain counts or the entire indictment all together.   
Mukasey (2007) provides the examples of the prosecution of Omar Abdel 
Rahman (the “blind sheik”) for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.  The 
government was compelled to turn over a list of unindicted co-conspirators to the 
defense, which included the name of Osama bin Laden.  Within days, a copy of that list 
was obtained by bin Laden in Khartoum, informing him that his connection to that attack 
and its operatives had been discovered.  Mukasey also points to the trial of Ramzi 
Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, when a nondescript 
bit of public testimony concerning a cell phone battery alerted terrorists still at large that 
one of their communication links had been compromised. The government had been 
monitoring that node of communication, which had provided enormously valuable 
intelligence.  Following its disclosure, the node was immediately shut down and further 
information lost (Mukasey, 2007). 
In August 2008, Padilla was convicted on all three counts for which he 
was charged, and in January 2009, he was sentenced to 21 years in prison (Whoriskey & 
Eggen, 2008).  However, due to the nature of the information that could not be brought to 
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trial, Padilla escaped being indicted on a more serious charge of U.S.C. 18 sec 2332(b), 
Conspiracy to Commit Acts of Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries.  Despite the 
government’s request for a sentence of life in prison, the judge handed down only 21 
years reduced by three years and eight months for the time Padilla served in the 
Charleston Navy brig while in military custody.  At sentencing, Judge Cooke expressed, 
“I do find that the conditions were so harsh for Mr. Padilla . . . they warrant consideration 
in the sentencing in this case” (Whoriskey & Eggen, 2008).  Cooke also expressed that 
because all of the defendants in the case, including Padilla, did not actually commit acts 
of violence in the U.S. or against U.S. persons, their sentences did not warrant more 
stringent punishments, such as 35 years to life.  However, Zacarious Moussaoui never 
carried out acts of violence in the U.S. or against U.S. persons, but was sentenced to life 
in prison, ultimately pleading guilty following a controversial four-year trial (Roh, 2005).  
As Kavanaugh stated, “this case is not an example of an adequate solution to the 
problem, had the judge been able to consider a conviction on conspiracy to commit acts 
of terrorism involving the use of radioactive material or the intent to bring down an 
apartment complex, it would be likely Padilla would have gotten 35 years to life” (2009).   
2. Al-Bahlul Case 
a. Key Takeaways 
1. The Military Commissions’ greater flexibility allowed for charging 
Al-Bahlul with more significant terrorism charges in a manner 
more efficient in its presentation to the jury and its execution of the 
prosecution. 
2. Military Commission rules allowed for the adequate protection and 
substitution of classified information presented as evidence, which 
played a key role in the conviction of Al-Bahlul. 
3. The use of hearsay statements from other detainees set the 
foundations for the use of MCRE 505 substitutions of classified 
information. 
4. The Military Commission process provided protection of the 
identity of “at risk persons” such as military personnel and other 
government agency personnel involved in Al-Bahlul’s prosecution.  
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5. The full integration of federal law enforcement agents into military 
& intelligence special operations units would enhance the 
government’s ability to facilitate the use of information collected 
during the capture of a high value terrorism subject as evidence in 
his prosecution.  
6. The Military Commission of Al-Bahlul clearly demonstrated 
legitimate due process to the accused, was successful in achieving 
a substantive "end game" conviction while protecting national 
security concerns.    
b. Bin Laden's Media Man 
In 2006, President Bush declared, “We will continue to bring the world's 
most dangerous terrorists to justice,” while petitioning Congress to pass a bill that would 
balance the government’s need to protect the sources, methods, techniques and activities 
utilized to collect classified information in order to prevent terrorist attacks, while at the 
same time, adhering to transparent constitutional principles and due process (Mariner, 
2008). That same month, Congress passed the 2006 Military Commission Act, which 
allowed detained terrorist suspects to be prosecuted in military commissions (Mariner, 
2008).  To date, due to the Military Commission system having faced nearly endless legal 
challenges and appeals from opponents and a recent suspension by President Obama 
(CNN, 2009), it has frustratingly heard three cases: Australian citizen David Hicks, a 
former kangaroo-skinner who pled guilty to Material Support to Terrorism (DefenseLink, 
2007), Salim Ali Hamdan, a driver for Usama Bin Laden who was found guilty of 
Material Support to Terrorism, and Ali Hamza Ahmad Suleiman Al-Bahlul.  Hicks and 
Hamdan were not considered high value terrorists.  Both received light sentences by the 
commission’s jury.  More importantly, each, as well as Al-Bahlul’s trial, were dress 
rehearsals in preparation for the more substantial cases in the queue for the government to 
test and adapt to the procedural issues it will rely on to convict terrorists such as 9/11 
mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammad (Mariner, 2008).   
Caught in Pakistan in late December 2001 while attempting to flee the 
region following the fall of the Taliban, Al Bahlul was charged under the authority of the 
2006 Military Commissions Act with 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(28), Conspiracy;  10 U.S.C. § 
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950u, Solicitation to commit Murder of Protected Persons, in violation of  10 U.S.C. § 
950v(b)(1), to Attack Civilians, in violation of 10 US.C. § 950v(b)(2), to Attack Civilian 
Objects, in violation of 10 US.C. § 950v(b)(3), to commit Murder in Violation of the Law 
of War, in violation of 10 US.C. § 950v(b)(15), to Destroy Property in Violation of the 
Law of War, in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(l6), to commit acts of Terrorism, in 
violation of 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(24), and to Provide Material Support for Terrorism, in 
violation of 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(25) (DefenseLink, 2008).  Office of Military 
Commissions (OMC) prosecutor Major Dan Cowhig explained that the government 
brought all the propaganda work committed by Al-Bahlul under the solicitation charge as 
a single continuous act.  Cowhig explained it would be far simpler to treat all the acts of 
solicitation as a single course of conduct than to parse each solicitation out as an 
individual offense. This allowed for each act of solicitation to fall under the same statute, 
just under different instances.  According to Cowhig, the authority to assert a count or 
offense for each act of solicitation (i.e., for each viewer of the USS Cole propaganda 
video produced by Al-Bahlul) is applicable, but it was more efficient to merge them and 
run them concurrently under the Military Commission Act for the purposes of trying the 
case, assisting the jury’s comprehension of the case, as well as for sentencing (Cowhig, 
2009).  
An immediate comparison of the charges brought against Al-Bahlul and 
those against Jose Padilla reflect more charges that are significantly more severe in their 
presentation and application.  Both men were charged with Conspiracy and Material 
Support. However, a closer review of Al-Bahlul’s Conspiracy charge demonstrates the 
government’s ability to outline Al Bahlul’s considerable contribution to Al Qaeda and 
Usama Bin Laden.  Specifically, a summary of the 2008 sworn Office of Military 
Commission (OMC) Charges state:  
Al Bahlul willfully joined the Al Qaeda enterprise and willfully entered 
into agreement with Al Qaeda and Usama Bin Laden with the intent to 
further the unlawful purposes outlined in the charges, and knowingly 
committed the following overt acts in order to accomplish some objective 
or purpose of the enterprise and the agreement: 
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1. Traveled to Afghanistan with the purpose and intent of joining Al 
Qaeda; 
2. Met with Saif Al Adel, the head of the Al Qaeda Security 
Committee, as a step toward joining the Al Qaeda organization; 
3. Underwent military-type training at an Al Qaeda sponsored 
training camp located in Afghanistan near Mes Aynak; 
4. Pledged fealty, or “bayat,” to the leader of al Qaeda, Usama bin 
Laden, joined al Qaeda, and provided personal services in support 
of al Qaeda.  (Al-Bahlul, 2008) 
These four specified acts were undertaken by both Padilla and Al-Bahlul 
with the only difference being Padilla met with Abu Haffs Al Masri (Comey, 2004; 
federal agent, personal communication, August 4, 2009) and not Saif Al Adel.  However, 
Padilla’s actions in this regard are never mentioned in his indictment because the source, 
other detainees, of the information were not available to testify or inadmissible due to the 
information being hearsay or coming from Padilla during his preventative detention 
(federal agent, personal communication, August 4, 2009)  There are seven additional acts 
listed against Al Bahlul which outline his actions as Bin Laden’s personal secretary and 
his appointment as the head of Al Qaeda’s media and propaganda wing, As Sahaab 
(Kohlmann, 2008).  In this position, Al Bahlul carried out an order by Bin Laden to 
produce a propaganda video depicting the attack on the USS Cole (DefenseLink, 2008).  
These specifications resemble the Material Support charges brought against Padilla 
though the material support was provided in different ways by each.  
In a review of Al Bahlul’s September 2008 Commission transcript (page 
192), he expressed his regret that he was not a part of the group that carried out the 9/11 
attacks.  Despite his desire to carry out violent attacks, Al Bahlul principally served in a 
support role as an administrator for Al Qaeda,  liking to refer to himself as a “media man” 
(Cowhig & Al-Bahlul, 2009).  Yet, in comparing the known facts that Padilla was a 
terrorist operative sent to actually conduct a violent attack utilizing a weapon of mass 
destruction to Al Bahlul, who was never tasked with such an action, it is disturbing that 
Padilla, convicted on all his counts, only received 21 years as opposed to the life sentence 
handed down to Al Bahlul. 
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According to Cowhig, well over half of the evidence discovered and 
utilized in Al-Bahlul’s trial was of a classified nature at the start of the process.  Through 
intricate coordination within the U.S. counterterrorism interagency, Cowhig revealed 
OMC was able to have some of the material declassified, but in many instances, 
developed Military Commission Act (MCA) judicially sanctioned redactions or 
substitutions.  As an example, Cowhig stated the use of the 2000 Predator footage 
showing the Bin Laden Tarnak Farms compound in Afghanistan was deemed classified 
by a U.S. intelligence agency.  Instead, OMC was able to utilize the identical footage 
leaked and shown on MSNBC (Cowhig, 2009).  This physical evidence was then 
authenticated by the testimony of a U.S. government agent who had conducted a sensitive 
site exploitation of Tarnak Farms following 9/11.  The government agent was able to 
confirm the location and physical characteristics of the compound (Al-Bahlul, 2008; 
Cowhig, 2009). 
Cowhig explained that one of the differences of the MCA Commission 
process is that it does possess a greater leeway in the use of hearsay statements from 
individuals who would not be available as a witness at trial. Those witnesses could range 
from other detainees, unavailable U.S. or foreign government agents, a confidential 
intelligence source, or a foreign national who is not subject to compulsory process.  The 
use of hearsay has some common “exceptions” that are permitted in Article III courts in 
order to prove a fact in controversy where there is good reason to believe the hearsay is 
reliable.  These exceptions include dying declarations, statements against self-interest and 
spontaneous utterances. The MCA has provided additional exceptions not admitted in 
Article III courts for the reasons of protecting classified information or the inability to 
present a witness, as those described above, at trial (Cowhig, 2009).  While this expanded 
MCA hearsay is an important distinction, Cowhig sturdily stressed the lack of value 
hearsay has to providing direct proof of the elements to the specified charged offenses.  
While the use of hearsay under the unique MCA exceptions can be seen as an advantage, 
it can only be effective so long as the hearsay is deemed to be or can be shown to be 
reliable.  Basing a charge on hearsay absent reliability has the potential to not only scuttle 
the charge levied but also the case in its entirety.   
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Effect use of any MCA unique hearsay must also be sustained with 
parallel evidence such as documents, electronic media, or eyewitness accounts (Cowhig, 
2009).  Cowhig informed the hearsay utilized in the Al Bahlul commission set 
foundations for the relevance of certain pieces of classified evidence in which the use of 
MCRE 505 permitted substitutions granted by the presiding Military Judge.  In this 
regard, Cowhig explained that if he had been unable to set those foundations and utilize 
the substitutions for the classified evidence where the unrefined origins of a piece of 
evidence would have revealed sources, methods, techniques or activities, the case would 
have been almost impossible to successfully prosecute. While Cowhig was able to utilize 
these mechanisms effectively in prosecuting Al-Bahlul, he stated the limited presentation 
of hearsay in this case was not a major factor and did not fall within any of the unique 
MCA exceptions.  While the unique MCA hearsay exceptions can provide an increased 
ability to protect and present classified evidence, it must not be seen as the magic bullet 
that will solve the problem in utilizing classified evidence.  As stated by Cowhig, “you 
can't prove a case with hearsay, but you can lose a case with hearsay” (2009).   
Cowhig stated some agencies are very reluctant to have their operatives 
and officers testify, even in a Commission environment (2009).  It is also preferable to 
have a law enforcement type who can take the witness stand in those instances (Cowhig, 
2009).  A review of the Al-Bahlul trial transcript (pp. 300–700) supports Cowhig’s 
assertion, as no less than five law enforcement personnel testified openly to issues of 
evidence recovered or statements made by Al-Bahlul during his interrogations compared 
with one military intelligence officer whose identity was concealed (Al-Bahlul, 2008).  
This example sustains the concept of fully integrating federal law enforcement personnel, 
such as highly trained FBI counterterrorism special agents, into intelligence and military 
special operations units.   
Bringing the law enforcement capability to SOCOM units would establish 
an immediate open chain of custody for material collected on target and promote proper 
handling of that evidence while it is being treated as intelligence information.  A central 
strategy interagency team would be the ideal venue for this concept to be fully developed.  
It could not only establish the process for how such an integration would work but also 
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develop criteria defining when and how federal law enforcement agents would be 
involved in operations targeting identified high value terrorist targets.   
A review of the Al-Bahlul trial transcript (pp. 1–300) demonstrates that 
Al-Bahlul was in many instances his own worst enemy.  During early proceedings 
leading up to his trial, he made countless incriminating statements in open sessions 
despite being warned by the presiding judges it was not in his best interest to do so.  
Regardless, as supported by Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation senior 
investigator, Evan Kohlmann, Al-Bahlul’s interrogation with FBI agents provided not 
only a wealth of intelligence information on the Al Qaeda organization, its senior 
members and its media wing but also countless incriminating statements by Al-Bahlul 
himself while in preventative detention (2008).    
3. Reid Case 
a. Key Takeaways 
1. The lack of a legal preventative detention regime hamstrung the 
U.S. government in thoroughly interrogating a captured terrorist 
for critical real time intelligence following his disrupted attack. 
2. Lack of central leadership and coordination within the 
counterterrorism community prevented critical information from 
being provided as evidence for prosecution of a terrorist subject. 
3. The lack of a legal preventative detention regime and the inability 
of Article III courts to utilize hearsay prevented the incriminating 
statements of detained senior Al Qaeda leaders from being 
available in Reid’s prosecution.   
b. The Shoe Bomber—Predecessor to the Underwear Bomber 
In a January 2008 publication for the American Constitution Society, 
Steven Schulhofer, while holding up Shoe Bomber Richard Reid’s successful post 9/11 
conviction as an example, contended that Federal Article III courts are already well 
equipped to protect classified information and achieve terrorism convictions (2008).  
However, a closer examination of the Reid case clearly demonstrates that Schulhofer’s 
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use of Reid as a shining example is not well founded.  The case exposes not only the 
dangerous holes in the system but the lack of central coordination within the 
counterterrorism community. 
In refuting Schulhofer, Reid was one of the few terrorists to actually be 
caught in the act of attempting to blow up an airliner—and live to plead guilty to it.  
Bolstered by the roughly 100 eye witnesses on the aircraft, the seizure of his shoe bomb 
as evidence and his own admissions in a very limited post arrest interrogation, the 
government’s need to affirmatively use classified information was negligible (Lever, 
2009).  Classifying Reid’s case as a “conviction” is disingenuous when in fact he pled 
guilty to 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a)(1) Attempted Use of a Weapon of Mass Destruction (U.S. 
v. Reid, 2002).   
Of greater concern are the facts that following the successful disruption of 
Reid’s attempted terrorist act by the passengers of American Airlines Flight 63, FBI 
Special Agents Brad Davis and Dan Choldin were afforded less than 36 hours to 
interrogate Reid for intelligence purposes (Davis, 2009).  In one respect, according to 
Davis, the FBI was fortunate that Reid decided to try and commit his act on a Saturday.  
Since his arrest occurred over a weekend, the next available time to take him before a 
magistrate for his mandatory initial appearance was Monday morning, when the courts 
were open.  The government was lucky that it actually got about 36 hours to interrogate 
Reid not only about his culpability but also about other potential plots and operatives.  
Had Reid been arrested on any other day of the week, Davis and the FBI would have 
been obliged to present him within 24 hours, at which point he would have been assigned 
an attorney who would have advised his client not to speak to the government any 
further. 
In Reid’s case, according to Davis, this is exactly what happened once 
Reid appeared in court on the following Monday.  It was not until 2007, six years 
following his guilty plea, that Davis and Choldin were finally able to approach and 
interview Reid at the SuperMax Federal prison in Colorado (Davis, 2009).  According to 
Davis, Reid’s case makes an excellent example of the need for a preventative detention 
regime to collect intelligence, evidence and prevent follow-on attacks.  Davis and 
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Choldin conducted two interviews of Reid during their window of opportunity between 
Saturday and Monday in December 2001.  In both instances, Reid was read, and waived, 
his Miranda warnings.  Davis attributes this to the fact that Reid claimed he did not 
recognize western law and was proud to take credit for the plot and its details (Davis, 
2009). Investigation later proved Reid’s claim to be untrue. Though Reid was happy to 
talk to the FBI without counsel at the outset, according to Davis, Reid initially would not 
identify anyone else involved in the plot, and it was Reid’s own blunders that permitted 
Davis and Choldin to utilize classic investigative techniques, outside of the classified 
realm, to uncover the true extent of the plot and undeniable connections to Al Qaeda 
(Davis, 2009).   
It was Davis and Choldin’s outstanding professional investigative skills 
that led to the identification of a second shoe bomber, Saajid Badat, who was arrested and 
pled guilty in the U.K. in 2005 (Timesonline, 2005).  Much of the evidence used against 
Badat was derived from the Reid investigation.  According to Davis, even in the limited 
amount of time he and Choldin had in speaking with Reid, they were successful in 
identifying four additional e-mail accounts from the one account Reid admitted to having.  
One of the identified accounts was deemed a covert account that Reid utilized in Paris to 
contact his Al Qaeda handler in Pakistan to notify he had been denied boarding earlier 
that day.  French authorities, working with the FBI, successfully secured the computer 
Reid had used at the hotel he stayed which provided even further intelligence and 
evidence of the plot (Davis, 2009).  
Even then, the government was opportune.  In late 2001, Wall Street 
Journal (WSJ) reporter Alan Cullison, while in Afghanistan, came into possession of a 
laptop computer that contained significant amounts of Al Qaeda information (Cullison, 
2002).  Contained on the computer was a trip report outlining in detail and matching 
perfectly to the travel itinerary given by Reid in his statements to Davis and Choldin.  
According to Davis, Cullison responsibly provided the laptop to operatives of a U.S. 
intelligence agency, but not before making a full copy of the computer’s contents for the 
WSJ.  When Davis and Choldin were made aware of this critical piece of evidence that 
directly tied Reid to Al Qaeda, they quickly sought to examine the computer and its 
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contents.  Following extensive deliberation and persistence, Davis and Choldin were 
eventually permitted to visit the U.S. intelligence agency’s headquarters to review the 
contents of the laptop (Davis, 2009).   
However, the intelligence agency would not permit the trip report and 
other key documents to be declassified.  Nor were Davis and Choldin permitted to take 
their notes with them following a through review of the laptops contents.  Ultimately, 
Davis was forced to subpoena the contents of the laptop from the WSJ in order to utilize 
the intelligence information as evidence for the case (Davis, 2009).  Davis states he was 
also able to obtain first-hand accounts from Guantanamo detainees Feroz Abbasi, Abu 
Zubaydah, and KSM regarding Reid’s Al Qaeda affiliation and terror assignment.  
However, Davis and Choldin were unequivocally told those statements would never be 
permitted for use in Reid’s prosecution (Davis, 2009).  
The case of Richard Reid is frequently held up by critics of military 
commissions as a shinning example that the civilian Article III system can meet the 
national security and prosecutive challenges of the modern day terrorism threat.  
However, even with the incredible investigative work accomplished by special agents 
Davis and Choldin, the U.S. government in many respects was very propitious any one of 
a number of things did not turn out differently.  The government was fortunate Reid’s Al 
Qaeda trip report was collected by a WSJ reporter who maintained possession of the 
information, which made it subject to subpoena.  The government was fortunate that Reid 
did not adhere to his own Al Qaeda training outlined in the Manchester document 
regarding interrogation, deciding instead to waive his Miranda rights and speak with the 
FBI.  The government was fortunate that Reid made mistakes when providing 
information that he thought would not incriminate him.  The government was fortunate 
that first-hand accounts by captured Al Qaeda terrorists would not be needed due to 
excellent investigative skills of Davis and Choldin, coupled with the government’s other 
fortunate breaks.  The government was lucky that Reid could not light the bomb on his 




sentenced to life in prison instead of turning his trial into a circus like his Al Qaeda co-
conspirator Zacarious Moussaoui.  The government is fortunate to have outstanding 
investigators like Davis and Choldin.    
4. Mutallab Case 
a. Key Takeaways 
1. The lack of a legal U.S. preventative detention regime hamstrung 
the U.S. government in thoroughly interrogating a captured 
terrorist for critical real time intelligence following his disrupted 
attack. 
2. Lack of central leadership and coordination within the 
counterterrorism community resulted in critical information from 
being fused and analyzed in order to prevent a terrorist attack. 
b. The Jihad Jockey—Taking a Cue from Reid 
On December 25, 2009, Christmas Day, a 23-year-old Nigerian man, 
Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab, attempted to detonate an improvised explosive device 
(IED) hidden in the crotch of his underwear (DeYoung & Fishel, 2010).  Much like 
Richard Reid’s attempt to ignite his explosives laden shoes, Mutallab, either by defect in 
the IED, incompetence or both, in conjunction with the brave actions by the passengers, 
failed to carry out his intended murderous act of terrorism.  Following his arrest in 
Detroit, and much like Reid, Abdul Mutallab spoke with FBI investigators and provided 
critical information.  Mutallab revealed that he was provided the training and explosives 
needed for the operation by members of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen 
(Obama, 2010; Schmitt & Lipton 2009).  Following his arrest, Mutallab’s initial court 
appearance was conducted in his hospital room where he was appointed an attorney and 
refused to answer further questions by investigators (Meserve & Quest, 2009).  Identical 
to the Reid case, the U.S. government had in its custody an Al Qaeda operative who was 




like Reid, despite Abdul Mutallab’s initial willingness to talk and provide critical 
intelligence to the FBI, that conduit of information was shut off once he was entered into 
the traditional Article III criminal process.   
In remarks given to address the Christmas Day plot, President Obama 
stated, “In our ever changing world, America’s first line of defense is timely, accurate 
intelligence that is shared, integrated, analyzed, and acted upon quickly and effectively” 
(2010).  With respect to the President’s remarks, surely there could be nothing more 
timely or critical in order to take immediate action than extracting the information 
possessed by failed terrorist operative.   
Following the President’s remarks, the White House released a summary 
review of the issues that lead to the Christmas Day 2009 attack.  Two of the three 
principal findings in the report stated: 1)  
A failure of intelligence analysis, whereby the CT community 
failed before December 25 to identify, correlate, and fuse into a 
coherent story all of the discrete pieces of intelligence held by the 
U.S. government related to an emerging terrorist plot against the 
U.S. Homeland organized by al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) and to Mr. Abdulmutallab, the individual terrorist.   
And 2)  
A failure within the CT community, starting with established rules 
and protocols, to assign responsibility and accountability for 
follow up of high priority threat streams, run down all leads, and 
track them through to completion. (White House, 2010)   
The report stated that the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is the 
primary organization that provides situational awareness to the counterterrorism 
community of ongoing terrorist threats and events via daily written reports, meetings and 
video teleconferencing in order to summarize current threat reporting (White House, 
2010). While the threat warning system involves analysis, it also extends to the other 
participants in the counterterrorism community that should be responsible for following 
up and acting on leads as a particular threat situation develops (White House, 2010).   
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While the report’s findings did concluded the sharing or availability of intelligence was 
not at issue, the means and speed by which different agencies provide the intelligence to 
NCTC was a contributing factor.   
The President subsequently issued a presidential memorandum outlining 
immediate corrective actions for nearly all participants in the counterterrorism 
community.  One corrective action of particular importance was directed to the National 
Counterterrorism Center whereby the President directed NCTC to, “Establish and 
resource appropriately a process to prioritize and to pursue thoroughly and exhaustively 
terrorism threat threads, to include the identification of appropriate follow-up action by 
the intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security communities [emphasis 
added]” (White House, 2010). While the President’s directive to NCTC is fitting, NCTC 
does not currently possess the authority nor influence to direct the operations or actions 
of the intelligence, law enforcement, or homeland security participants within the 
counterterrorism community.  
C. SUMMARY ANALYSIS BASED ON THE KEY ASSUMPTIONS AND 
QUESTIONS  
While it is good to be lucky, relying on luck is not a sound counterterrorism 
strategy.  Examining the Padilla, Al-Bahlul, Reid and Mutallab cases demonstrates that 
dealing with the international terrorism issue is not solely a military, intelligence, or law 
enforcement predicament.  As summarized by Judge Mukasey (2007, 2009), Special 
Agent Kavanaugh (2009) and Captain Howard (2009), the complexities and 
consequences of modern day international terrorism make it something that falls in 
between these schemes, thereby indicating the correct solution is some composite of all 
of the above. If the first priority of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy is to prevent the 
next attack, and a subsequent priority is to seek fitting justice of those who plan, support 
and carry out acts of terrorism, then what can be derived from these cases?   
One can recognize the deficiencies that currently exist in Article III courts when 
coupled with the need to derive intelligence from captured terrorists.  The Padilla, Reid 
and Mutallab cases demonstrate that the U.S. government’s deficiency in being able to 
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hold and interrogate a terrorist subject while either being in possession of intelligence 
indicating his intent, or in Reid and Mutallab’s cases, being caught in the act.  In the 
Padilla, Reid, and Mutallab cases, the priority to identify plots and operatives was at 
stake.  In Padilla’s case, he was controversially designated an enemy combatant and 
interrogated under a law of war convention.  In Reid and Mutallab’s cases, the 
government’s inability to question him at length to satisfy its first priority is a critical 
factor considering it was shut out once they was formally entered into the Article III 
criminal system.   
One can also witness the inadequacy of the Article III system not built to handle 
various aspects of the military and intelligence information derived from counterterrorism 
operations.  The Padilla and Al-Bahlul cases demonstrated the involvement of military 
and intelligence special operations units in obtaining valuable evidentiary information.  
Furthermore, the cases demonstrate the problematic testimonial requirements these 
personnel must contend with as a result of executing their duties.  One can recognize the 
need for central planning, strategy and doctrine development in dealing with terrorism 
subjects even before they are captured.  The Padilla, Reid, and Mutallab cases 
demonstrated a lack of counterterrorism planning, strategy coordination or follow 
through on threat stream information.  In Padilla’s case, had there been superior planning 
and coordination based on the intelligence in the government’s possession then the use of 
the outdated material witness warrant would have been unnecessary to arrest Padilla.  
Furthermore, had classified information been available earlier in his detention under the 
material witness warrant, then perhaps formal criminal charges could have been brought 
that would have made his designation as an enemy combatant unnecessary. 
As demonstrated in the Padilla and Reid cases, valuable intelligence information 
was unavailable for use as evidence due to the lack of a legal preventative detention 
system and the inability to introduce detainee hearsay statements for national security 
interests.  In Padilla’s case, that information would most likely have sent him away for 
far longer than 17 years, probably for life.  As of today, Padilla will likely be out of 
prison at the age of 53.  Usama Bin Laden is 60, and it would be difficult to claim that 
even at his age he is not considered a dangerous threat.  While both Reid and Al-Bahlul 
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received life sentences, in Reid’s case, he was literally caught in the act and chose to 
plead guilty.  Al Bahlul’s case demonstrated the ability of the Office of Military 
Commission prosecution team to deal with a considerable volume of classified 
information while having the time to work within the counterterrorism interagency to get 
a majority of it either declassified or substituted for use in trial.  The existence of a 
central interagency team would enable the development of mechanisms to enhance 
cooperative effort, much like in the Al Bahlul case, ensuring the proper endgame for a 
dedicated terrorist such as he is.   
All three cases demonstrated that the current rules dealing with the use of hearsay 
and discovery are key stumbling blocks in producing an effective “endgame” for terrorist 
subjects.  The preventative detention situations of both Al-Bahlul and Padilla, in addition 
to other high value detainees, produced not only a plethora of highly valuable intelligence 
information but also damning evidence.  Ultimately, these cases clearly demonstrate that 
the government, in many instances, has been fortunate to avoid being presented with 
more formidable challenges, considering the holes in the system.  However, Al Qaeda 
and other sophisticated terror groups such as Hizballah have clearly demonstrated their 
ability to adapt.  Hence, the U.S. counterterrorism community must also adapt since it 
cannot expect that future captured terrorism subjects will act as dim-witted as Reid and 
Al-Bahlul, or be as fortunate as it was in the Padilla and Reid cases.  The U.S. 
government counterterrorism community must plan for the worst-case scenario and do so 
in such a way that meets the first priority of preventing attacks.   
The central question of this thesis sought to determine if the civilian Article III 
system is able to meet the national security demands of the modern day terrorism threat. 
When considering the issues and deficiencies presented in these cases studies, it is 
evident that significant problems exist which not only place the U.S. at great risk but also 
inhibit the government’s ability achieve adequate end game convictions.  The problems 
exposed here raise the questions of how the government can bring together the 
intelligence and evidence disciplines.  What steps can be taken to assimilate the 
national/homeland security and criminal justice regimes?  In what ways can the U.S. 
proceed to fuse the essential elements of disruption, intelligence collection, and 
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prosecution?  In the following chapter, a look at one of the most contentious issues will 
be discussed—that of a legal U.S. preventative detention regime.  A careful study of the 
preventative detention regimes of other democracies coupled with a recommended course 
of action on how a U.S. preventative detention regime can work will act as the link to 
other recommended steps.  These recommendations can go a long way to meeting the 
U.S. security demands while enhancing the facilitation of classified intelligence 
information as evidence to meet the “endgame.” 
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IV. PREVENTATIVE DETENTION AND CLASSIFIED 
STATEMENTS, FOREIGN LESSONS FOR ENSURING THE 
“ENDGAME” 
A. THE PREVENTATIVE DETENTION DILEMMA 
The terror attacks of September 11 brought a substantial shift in the way the 
United States historically dealt with the issue of terrorism and those who committed and 
supported terrorist acts.  Moving from the pre-9/11 reactionary law enforcement doctrine 
to an offensive military approach, the shift has fundamentally challenged the philosophic 
balance between freedom and security.  The restructuring of U.S. national security 
priorities now demands pre-emption of terrorist attacks at the forefront of the 
counterterrorism effort.  This prevention first mantra necessitates the aggressive 
collection of essential intelligence from all available sources, particularly from the 
interrogation of captured terrorist subjects.  As stated by former Assistant Deputy 
Attorney General John Yoo, perhaps the most effective weapon in this asymmetrical 
conflict is the intelligence gained from captured operatives in order to prevent terrorist 
attacks (2006).  The difficulty currently facing the U.S. is the time needed to adequately 
interrogate a subject does not appear to mesh with the basic due process elements of the 
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution or the writ of habeas corpus, 
found in the suspension clause of Article One, section nine. 
Changes in domestic and international law have spurred the debate regarding the 
rights of accused terrorists in judicial proceedings held before Federal Article III courts 
and military commissions (Boeving 2007).  In Hamdi vs. Rumsfeld and Hamdan vs. 
Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court issued opinions on the scope of the writ of habeas corpus, 
the perpetual detention of foreign enemy combatants and the rights of U.S. citizens held 
as enemy combatants (Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 2006).  Coinciding with President Obama’s 
executive order (E.O. 13492, 2009) to close the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility and 
the suspension of military commissions (Shane, Mazzetti & Cooper, 2009), determining 
an appropriate judicial forum along with the substantive and procedural rights due to the 
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accused have become serious matters of debate.  Directly correlated with these issues, is 
the government’s current lack of any clear or consistent policy on where and how 
captured terrorism suspects should be brought to trial (Schulhofer & Turner, 2005).  
These intertwined issues have become even more muddled with the recent decision to 
remove five of the 9/11 conspirators from the military commission system and try them 
in Federal Article III courts in New York.   
While the current administration states it remains committed to closing the 
Guantanamo Bay facility, it has encountered significant problems and resistance in 
accomplishing the task.  This was further compounded by the Christmas 2009 attempted 
airline bombing by Abdul Mutallab, who reportedly acknowledged that he was trained in 
Yemen by Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (Schmitt & Lipton, 2009).  With nearly 
half of the current detainees at the Guantanamo Bay facility from Yemen (Finn, 2010) 
and with a recent Pentagon report indicating an increase in those released returning to 
terrorist activity (Mount, 2010), repatriating these individuals in order to facilitate closing 
the facility has become further problematic. 
Regardless of the judicial forum, whether Federal Article III court, military 
commission or some variation of the two, the introduction, and use of classified 
information is guaranteed to be an issue.  As explained by Schulhofer (2004, 2009) and 
Carafano (2006), the challenge of using and protecting classified information in terrorism 
prosecutions is arduous.  Successfully achieving a consequential conviction can hinge on 
classified intelligence information collected among other means, such as subject 
interrogation (Schulhofer & Turner, 2005).  In a similar respect, the ability to prosecute 
effectively a High Value Detainee (HVD) can be seriously compromised due to his 
preventative detention circumstances.  The mere fact the HVD is under the control of the 
U.S. government without having customary criminal due process, places his prosecution 
in jeopardy.  Moreover, it also potentially taints the information he provides during his 
detention towards the prosecution of fellow terror suspects.  The quandary of how to 
judicially handle the 100 or so HVDs currently detained at the Guantanamo Bay prison 
provides an earnest example of the problem this unresolved issue brings.  While it is  
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recognized that interrogation methods used against some of these HVDs has also 
complicated their prosecution, this aspect is not universal among the population (Shane, 
2008).   
The debate concerning a U.S. preventative detention system has been robust.  
Understandably, the concept of an American preventative detention regime is an 
uncomfortable one since the perception is that it cuts across democratic and constitutional 
principals.  However, an examination of similar detention systems in other democratic 
nations and a closer look at the constitutional interpretation does offer potential solutions. 
The application of legislative action, strict checks and balances, with periodic review 
within a constitutional framework can provide a needed invaluable counterterrorism tool.  
In the spirit of Brookings Institute’s Benjamin Wittes, the intention of this thesis is not to 
continue the debate of whether the U.S. should have a preventative detention regime but 
what can be learned from foreign allies to fashion a U.S. model.  The intent is to 
demonstrate that an acceptable American preventative detention regime is possible and 
can facilitate the use of classified intelligence as invaluable evidence.   
B. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN SYSTEMS 
1. U.K. Model of Preventative Detention 
As the U.S. faces the dilemma of balancing its security with preserving its 
constitutional process and freedoms, what examples can it draw on to develop suitable 
solutions?  In his opening remarks during a 2006 Senate Appropriations subcommittee 
hearing, Senator Judd Greg summarized the effort by stating that a reactive mindset in 
dealing with terrorism does not work in the context of the threat that America faces 
(Senate, 2006).  Greg states the terrorist acts as those committed on 9/11, the 2004 
Madrid train bombing, the London July 7, 2005 bombing or the disrupted 2006 U.K. 
airline plot cannot be tolerated, nor can a legal system structured around the concept of 
permitting a terrorist event to occur and then reactively having the criminals brought to 
justice (Senate, 2006).  Greg observes that the U.K. legal system, while not identical to 
the U.S., shares a natural commonality with the U.S. Bill of Rights having evolved from 
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English Common Law (Senate, 2006).  The hearing sought to learn from the British 
experience in dealing with terrorism and determine if there are mechanisms that could be 
adopted while remaining within the context of the U.S. constitutional structure (Senate, 
2006).  From the testimony provided by Judge Richard Posner and Former Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, the U.S., contrary to public impression, is capable 
of facilitating nearly all aspects currently implemented in the British system within the 
American constitutional framework (Senate, 2006).   
Primarily viewed as a law enforcement tool, the British preventative detention 
regime is currently referred to as “pre-charge” detention and has its origins dating back to 
the 1939 Prevention of Violence Act (PVA) during its conflict in Northern Ireland (Blum, 
2008).  Following its expiration in 1952, the PVA was reintroduced as the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act in 1974 and was again modified with the 2000 Terrorism Act.  The 
significant change regarding the 2000 legislation is that it made the Terrorism Act 
permanent and no longer subject to yearly renewals.  The pre-charge or preventative 
detention facets were similar in that British authorities could arrest and detain a suspect 
without charge on “reasonable suspicion” in conjunction with the certification of the 
Home Secretary (i.e., Attorney General).  Amended again in 2003, the regime increased 
the maximum timeframe from seven to 14 days.   
The most current form of the U.K. pre-charge detention regime was established 
with another modification in the Terrorism Act of 2006 whereby the government could 
detain a subject for a maximum of 28 days with approval of a designated magistrate.  
Following the initial 48-hour period, the crown prosecution must submit for judicial 
authority to extend the detention to seven days and for successive seven day periods up to 
the limit of 28 days. The final 14 days requires the authority of a High Court judge vice a 
designated magistrate (Blum, 2008).  This tool was utilized effectively to disrupt the 
August 2006 U.K. airline plot to blow up 10 commercial planes over the Atlantic.  Of the 
24 suspects originally detained, eight were ultimately charged and prosecuted 
(Transportation Security Administration [TSA], 2008). 
The British preventative detention system can be authorized in order to (1) obtain 
relevant intelligence/evidence by questioning the suspect; (2) preserve evidence or (3) to 
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ascertain the possibility of deportation or charging of the suspect (U.K. Terrorism Act, 
2000).  The 28-day detention period also allows for a more complete forensic 
examination of any electronic media obtained during the suspect’s arrest. The detainee 
can be represented by a special counsel who is cleared to handle classified information 
and the process is monitored by an independent reviewer assigned by the Home 
Secretary, who scrutinizes each individual case of detention (U.K. Terrorism Act, 2000).   
Most recently, the Prime Minister and British Parliament considered legislation, 
submitted by the Home Office, to extend preventative detention to 42 days in cases where 
the cooperation of foreign governments is necessary.  The House of Commons narrowly 
passed the measure in the summer of 2008, but it was defeated in the House of Lords in 
October later that year (BBC, 2008).  Despite the rejection of the 2008 measure, of 
significance is the involvement of the British Parliament, which provides legislative 
legitimacy, in conjunction with robust judicial oversight, which has been a staple of this 
detention regime since its reintroduction in 2000.   
When comparing the counterterrorism or security framework of each country, the 
U.S. Congress is conspicuously absent.  Essentially the U.S. has bypassed the criminal 
justice system and, as authorized by the President’s war power privilege, categorized 
terrorist subjects as enemy combatants, pursuant to the laws of war.  Not officially 
afforded the protections guaranteed under the Geneva Conventions against interrogation 
and until recently held incommunicado without legal representation for an indefinite 
period of time, the enemy combatant policy has come under intense debate (Blum, 2008).   
However, in his 2006 testimony to the Senate sub-committee on appropriations, 
Judge Posner articulated that though the innovative anti-terrorist preventative detention 
measures available in the U.K. might violate a U.S. statute, it would not violate the 
Constitution.  Supported by Professor Yoo, Posner proceeds to explain there is nothing in 
the Constitution that discusses a mandated 48-hour window in which an arrested subject 
must be charged or given a hearing.  Posner explains that the 48-hour rule was 
established via the free interpretation of the Supreme Court relative to the due process 
clauses and could be remedied by Congress through legislative action authorizing a 15–
30 day preventative detention regime (Posner, 2006). 
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2. Israeli Model of Preventative Detention 
With the door of legislative reform now open, additional lessons on preventative 
detention can be extracted from a careful review of the Israeli model.  Though 
surrounded by much larger and hostile neighbors and having suffered over 152 attacks 
during a six-year period beginning in 2000, Israel maintains a rigorous yet transparent 
system with judicial oversight (Blum, 2008).  Referred to as “Administrative Detention,” 
the Israeli model is solely to mitigate a threat posed to the state and public security by an 
individual whom intelligence identifies as posing such a threat.  The Israeli system does 
not incorporate the purpose of administrative detention for trial and conviction, but 
simply to prevent dangerous identified threats from materializing into deadly attacks.  
Administrative detention can be an option when the information or intelligence is of a 
classified nature and is unavailable for use in a criminal trial (Gross, 2001). 
The Israeli system draws its origin from the British Defense (Emergency) 
Regulations of 1945, enacted prior to the nation’s establishment.  Israel modified the 
system under the 1979 Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law (EPDL). While the Israeli 
model is clearly more of a war or national security tool, it has an extensive judicial 
component of balance and oversight.  EDPL provided more rights to detainees, including 
the requirement that a detainee be presented before the district court within 48 hours of 
arrest for judicial review of the detention, allows access to counsel, permits appeal to the 
Supreme Court and mandates three-month periodic reviews by the district court 
(Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law [EPDL], 1979).  Unlike the British model, 
individuals can be subject to administrative detention for an indefinite period of time.  
The Israeli model does possess separate systems of administrative detention for 
Israel proper vice the Palestinian Territories.  The prime distinction being military 
commanders can detain a suspect within the Territories for up to six months at a time.  
The subject is entitled to judicial review within eight days of arrest, has access to counsel 
within 34 days, and possesses the ability to appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court for relief 
(Blum, 2008).  The most recent modification to Israeli detention was established with the 
2002 Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law.  This legislation permits the detention 
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of “members of a force perpetrating hostile acts against Israel,” theoretically permitting 
the detention of suspects based on mere association with a terrorist organization such as 
Hezbollah.  The law is differentiated from administrative detention by providing for 
access of counsel within seven days of detention, judicial review within 14 days and a 
right of appeal to the Supreme Court within 30 days.  The law allows the detainee to be 
held until the Minister of Defense ascertains that the group with which the detainee is 
associated has ceased hostilities against Israel or until a court determines that the 
detainee’s release would not threaten state security (Blum, 2008). 
Of particular notice in examining the Israeli preventative detention system, is the 
amount of judicial oversight provided to the regime, the rights of detainees to counsel and 
appeal while providing a means to protect classified or sensitive information and 
operations.  Though the administrative detention system is not designed with the intended 
purpose of extracting information via interrogation, the 2002 Unlawful Combatants Law 
permits this activity.  Israel has also differentiated between detentions as it applies to 
citizens and non-citizens in terms of the rules that are applied to each of those 
individuals.  Both the U.S. and Israel appear to approach the issues surrounding the need 
for a preventative detention regime from the perspective of war.  Both nations utilize 
similar terms in many instances often referring to unlawful combatants while stating the 
need to protect classified sources and methods.  While the British approach appears to be 
more law enforcement centric, the U.K. system does permit for the “questioning” of a 
detained suspect as one of the principal reasons for executing the preventative detention 
authority.   
3. French Counterterrorism Court 
The French counterterrorism strategy relies heavily on preemptive arrests, 
preventative detention, and a highly effective domestic intelligence-gathering network.  
The French perspective can be best articulated by senior French anti-terrorism judge 
Jean-Louis Bruguiere: 
Terrorism is a very new and unprecedented belligerence, a new form of 
war and we should be flexible in how we fight it. When you have your 
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enemy in your own territory, whether in Europe or in North America, you 
can't use military forces because it would be inappropriate and contrary to 
the law. So you have to use new forces, new weapons. (Whitlock, 2004)     
Possessing some of the most aggressive anti-terrorism laws and policies in 
Europe, the French government has effectively disrupted radical Islamic threats for the 
past two decades.  While other western nations struggle to balance security and freedoms, 
France has experienced little public dissent over its policies and tactics that would be 
controversial, if not illegal, in the United States (Whitlock, 2004).  Following a wave of 
deadly attacks throughout the 1980s, which resulted from a failed “accommodation and 
sanctuary” policy, France adapted its approach with legislation in 1986 specifically to 
target terrorism (Shapiro & Suzan, 2003).  One of the results of the 1986 legislation was 
that it centralized all judicial proceedings relating to terrorism while remaining within the 
Trial Court of Paris.   
The French system employs an investigative magistrate or juge d'instruction who 
acts neither in the capacity of a prosecutor or defense counsel.  The magistrate, who is 
considered politically independent, is charged with conducting the investigation, utilizing 
techniques and tools such as wiretapping, subpoenas, and search warrants.  The 
magistrates work closely with the French domestic intelligence agency, Direction de la 
Surveillance du Territoire (DST), and the Division Nationale Anti-Terroriste of the 
Judicial Police (DNAT) as their investigative arms (Shapiro & Suzan, 2003).  Over time, 
this system developed a cadre of well-informed and knowledgeable judges who came to 
be subject matter experts in the realm of terrorism and the groups who were targeting 
France.  This system also enhanced the fundamental understanding between specific 
judicial authorities and those of the DST.  This provided confidence to the DST that the 
judges understood the complexities of intelligence work and the threat judicial process 
can pose to intelligence sources and operations (Shapiro & Suzan, 2003).  The DST can 
also go directly to the judges or to the prosecutors when they are in possession of 
information that they feel is criminal in nature and would warrant the opening of a 
criminal investigation.  
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While the prosecution of terrorism subjects is still solely handled by the 
traditional judicial court, the investigative magistrates possess the authority to convert an 
intelligence investigation into a traditional judicial investigation when the circumstances 
and facts warrant.  The combination of expertise, enhanced coordination with the 
intelligence service and the judicial powers vested in the magistrates has established a 
powerful counterterrorism mechanism with great flexibility and efficiency (Shapiro & 
Suzan, 2003). 
The differences in the U.S. and French legal frameworks are considerable and any 
suggestion to implement a similar investigative capacity by any of component of the U.S. 
judiciary is not only undesirable but also unwarranted.  Nevertheless, there are concepts 
of the French Counterterrorism model that can provide valuable lessons for adaptations to 
existing U.S. legal constructs, particularly with respect to a U.S. preventative detention 
system.  The U.S. already has the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) 
authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978.10 The FISC is 
comprised of 11 judges and presides over the determination of applications, typically 
from the FBI, for the use of clandestine search warrants and electronic surveillance 
against suspected “agents of a foreign power” operating inside the United States.  
Because of the sensitive nature of its business, the FISC hearings are closed to the public, 
and, while records of the proceedings are kept, those records are not available to the 
public. Due to the classified nature of its proceedings, only government attorneys are 
usually permitted to appear before the FISC (Cohen & Wells, 2004).   
The FISC provides an excellent legal platform from which the U.S. can readily 
facilitate the French counterterrorism court concept.  In a U.S. version, the court’s 
function would not be one of determining innocence or guilt but to protect classified 
information, sources and methods during the determination of if a terrorist operative 
would be subject to preventative detention.  This legal regime would facilitate not only 
                                                 
10 FISA, Pub.L. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, enacted October 25, 1978, 50 U.S.C. ch.36, S. 1566.  FISA is 
an Act of Congress which prescribes procedures for the physical and electronic surveillance and collection 
of “foreign intelligence information” between “foreign powers” and “agents of foreign powers,” which may 
include American citizens and permanent residents suspected of being engaged in espionage and violating 
U.S. law on territory under United States control.  FISA was amended in with the 2001 PATRIOT Act 
primarily to include terrorism on behalf of groups that are not specifically backed by a foreign government. 
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the priority of preventing terrorist attacks but also preserve the use of information and 
evidence at trial derived from detained operatives.  Utilizing the FISC to function in its 
established capacity to hear counterterrorism-preventative detention petitions from the 
executive branch will be discussed in more detail in the proceeding chapter.   
C. SUMMARY 
The major issue facing the U.S. is how it intends to proceed in regards to 
providing an acceptable legal solution to its preventive detention dilemma.  In the eight 
years following 9/11 and amidst intense debate, both the executive and legislative 
branches of government have been timid in not aggressively seeking to combine elements 
of existing democratic preventative detention systems that meet the needs of national 
security within the American constitutional framework.  In a May 2009, President Obama 
stated that he recognized the national security requirement of a preventative detention 
system for terrorists who, “the government may have trouble prosecuting but who are 
also too dangerous to release” (Finn, 2009; Obama, 2009).  The U.S. must seek to 
accomplish both facets of:  1) not releasing dangerous terrorists by, 2) convicting them 
with effective and fair prosecutions.  A legal preventative detention regime will go a long 
way in meeting these objectives and the evidence obtained from such a system is critical 
to meeting an end game objective.  The President also stipulated the requirements for 
such a regime in that they are: 
1. Fair  
2. Contain federal judicial oversight and 
3. Created by an act of Congress.   
The President called for a system that is “clear, defensible, with lawful standards, 
possessing a thorough process of periodic review, so that any prolonged detention is 
carefully evaluated and justified” (Finn, 2009; Obama, 2009).  While President Obama 
has defined the characteristics an American preventative detention regime must possess, 
he does not address the tactical and practical requirements that must accompany such a 
system if it is to be capable of supporting the pre-emptive attack priority while ensuring a 
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prosecutive endgame.  The lessons provided by British, Israeli and French allies bestow a 
clear guide to a highly valuable prevention and end game tool.  The next chapter will 
fashion the steps the U.S. government can take to fill the holes in the Article III process 
demonstrated in the case study analysis.  These steps, which include a detailed 
framework of a U.S. preventative detention system, are doable and will greatly enhance 
meeting the endgame objective. 
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V. THREE RECOMMENDED STEPS FOR ENSURING THE 
ENDGAME 
In chess, the endgame refers to the stage of the game when there are few pieces 
left on the board.  While the distinction between where the “middle game” and 
“endgame” split is not often clear, the shift from one to the other can occur gradually or 
with a rapid succession of a few moves.  Significantly, the strategic concerns and 
characteristics of the moves of the middle game and endgame are considerably different.  
Endgames in chess involve attempting to promote pawns in rank and utilizing the king, 
typically protected during the middle game, as an attacking piece by bringing it to the 
middle of the board.  In the endgame, the stronger side seeks to exchange pieces (knights, 
bishops, rooks, and queens), while not concerning itself with the exchange of pawns. This 
strategy generally transforms the stronger player’s advantage into a victory (Silman, 
2007).   
The modern era terrorism threat is not a board game, but the concept of strategic 
moves is analogous.  The repercussions of losing are severe, particularly in an age when 
weapons of mass destruction appear to be more accessible than at any previous time.  The 
U.S. has rightfully made aggressive moves since September 11 but with considerable 
criticism in many respects.  These aggressive moves have transitioned the U.S. from the 
middlegame to the endgame.  However, have all the precipitating moves, or lack thereof, 
possessed the characteristics indicative of playing in the endgame?  To capitalize on its 
advantage and put away the opponent, the U.S. must also transition to an endgame 
strategic mindset and make moves such as bringing its king to the center of the board.  
This chapter proposes three principal recommendations the U.S. can readily enact if it is 
bold enough.  These steps are the type of moves executed in the endgame.  These steps 
will be considerable in knocking off and putting away, a checkmate as it were, the 
knights, bishops, rooks and queens of America’s terrorism enemy.  These steps facilitate 
the use of classified information as evidence while protecting the systems and values that 
are uniquely American.  They bring about an endgame result of checkmate for the 
terrorist opposition. 
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The three principal recommendations in this chapter seek to:      
1. Establish NCTC as the standalone counterterrorism organization with the 
authority to conduct not just the strategic planning but the coordination 
and execution of the counterterrorism mission. 
2. Establish a legal U.S. preventative detention system by blending elements 
of the British and Israeli systems while drawing from the French security 
court concepts by utilizing the existing FISA court for judicial authority 
and overview.   
3. Institute a full and permanent interagency integration of FBI 
counterterrorism agents with tier one Special Operations Command 
special mission units.   
A. RECOMMENDATION 1: UNITY OF COMMAND—ESTABLISH NCTC AS 
THE COUNTERTERRORISM INTERAGENCY ORGANIZATION WITH 
AUTHORITY TO DEVELOP PLANS, ASSIGN TASKS, COORDINATE 
OPERATIONS AND DEVELOP DOCTRINE AND POLICY 
In Chapter I of this thesis, as presented in the problem statement, the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) through the Senior Inter-Agency Strategy Team (SIST) 
identified strategic impediments to meeting objectives as outlined in the National 
Implementation Plan for the War on Terrorism (NIP).  One such identified obstacle is the 
lack of central leadership or permanent interagency structure that seeks to strategically 
facilitate the proper collection, handling, and disposition of classified intelligence 
information for use as evidence in the prosecution of terrorist subjects. Since 9/11 there 
has been significant effort to bring together all the disparate departments and agencies to 
more effectively apply all the elements of national power that exist in each respectively.   
Nonetheless, as discussed in a December 2008 Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) report, the organizations and procedures in the national security community, still 
in use today, are steeped in an antiquated twentieth century bureaucratic framework 
where departments and agencies are fiercely protective of perceived proprietary turf and 
where fiscal allocation is appropriated by agency and not by functional area (Dale, 
Serafino, & Towell, 2008). The debate within the counterterrorism community regarding 
the adequacy of the current system and potential solutions to meet the twenty-first 
century unconventional threats is wide ranging.  Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, East 
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Africa, and the issues demonstrated in the case studies of this thesis reveal flaws in the 
U.S. government’s ability develop and prioritize strategies within an integrated and 
coordinated framework. This missing integrated and coordinated framework negatively 
impacts the U.S. counterterrorism community’s ability to effectively facilitate the unified 
execution of complex counterterrorism missions with common end game goals.   
1. The Need to Modernize the Counterterrorism Structure 
A 2008 House Armed Services Committee Panel (HASC) report on protecting 
American security included “interagency coordination” as a primary area in need of 
modification (House Armed Services Committee [HASC], 2008a).  Later that year, 
during full HASC hearings, ranking members called for modernizing the national security 
architecture so that it is prepared to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century threat 
environment (HASC, 2008b). These examples bolster the complaint that the 
counterterrorism community does not adequately coordinate the strategic planning or 
execution of counterterrorism operations.  These results can leave undetected gaps in 
planning, wasted resources, duplication of effort, working at cross purposes and 
ultimately failure in execution.  Historically, responsibility in mission specific areas has 
been assigned to a “lead agency” for coordinating the efforts of multiple agencies that are 
involved by serving a function or role.  The lead agency may be permanent or temporary, 
and it may or may not be able to give direction and assign tasks to the other agencies 
(Dale, Serafino, & Towell, 2008).   
In August 2004, the National Counterterrorism Center was created by executive 
order and later codified by Congress in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004.  NCTC exists as an extra-agency entity constructed by providing personnel 
from key participating agencies including state and local authorities. The Director of 
NCTC reports directly to the President on the conduct of strategic operational planning 
for counterterrorism activities for integrating all elements of U.S. national power 
(Maguire, 2008). The Director also reports to the Director for National Intelligence as the 
primary organization in the U.S. government for analysis and integration of all terrorism 
intelligence (Best, 2010; NCTC, 2009).   
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The interagency concept of NCTC mirrors that of the incredible success 
demonstrated at the Joint Interagency Task Force SOUTH (JIATF-S).  Over the course of 
20 years, JIATF-S has built the consummate integrated network of law enforcement, 
intelligence, and military assets. Created with the focus to detect activities and interdict 
the shipments of narco-terrorist organizations, JIATF-S serves as the model for how to 
integrate and utilize all the assets of national power to effectively handle complex 
national policy issues, whether it is illegal drugs, weapons proliferation, or international 
terrorism. Trust and cohesion are built through a clear defined mission statement, goals 
and objectives and a unity of effort forged by the integration of key personnel from the 
various counterterrorism agencies (Yeatman, 2006).   
An effective independent interagency body must promote a sustained 
environment in which the interagency personnel assigned possess a strong sense of 
ownership in the mission and the entity for which they work.  For the alliance to be 
successful, the workforce must sever the umbilical cord to the workforce’s respective 
parent organizations for the duration of their assignment. In order for the participating 
agencies and the workforce to buy-in, there must be the realistic expectation that the 
stand-alone agency has the authority and clout to act on its mission statement and achieve 
its goals and objectives. Absent the legal authority or hammer to compel the participating 
agencies to act on the plans it develops, the entity will remain a toothless tiger. 
2. The NCTC Solution, the Concerns and the Possibilities 
The U.S. government has already expended great effort and a tremendous amount 
of resources to create an independent stand-alone agency that is compromised of 
personnel from the participating counterterrorism community.  The mission statement for 
NCTC states: 
Lead our nation’s effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the 
threat, sharing that information with our partners, and integrating all instruments of 
national power to ensure unity of effort.  (NCTC, 2009)  
NCTC is mission specific, and its mission statement aligns precisely, “integrating 
all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort, [emphasis added]” with what 
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needs to occur concerning counterterrorism strategy development, planning and mission 
execution (NCTC, 2009). All of the players are already in the McLean, Virginia Liberty 
Crossing complex, including the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland 
Security, Department of Energy, and Department of State among others (NCTC, 2009).  
So what is missing?  NCTC possess the foundation of the successful JIATF-S construct 
but as stated by FBI Executive Assistant Director Arthur Cummings, “the current 
legislation does not permit NCTC to task agencies and direct operations.  NCTC can 
develop the plans but there currently is no mechanism that gives them the authority to put 
those plans into action” (Cummings, 2009).  NCTC Deputy Director for Strategic 
Planning, Vice Admiral Joseph Maguire, confirmed this statement explaining that he has 
the power to task departments and agencies across the homeland security spectrum, 26 in 
all, but he cannot direct their actions to carry them out (Maguire, 2008). Maguire 
emphasized that getting these agencies to make decisions and execute what you are 
asking them to do, absent the authority, is to say the least, “a great challenge” (Maguire, 
2008). Maguire articulated that the challenge stems from asking agencies, in some cases, 
to give up control of legacy missions and practices in order to execute broader strategic 
plans.  In the territorial inter-agency environment, with so many different approaches and 
cultures, the resistance to change can be daunting (Maguire, 2008). 
As with any new endeavor, strategy, or player to the game, concerns abound.  
Interviews with senior members of the counterterrorism community expressed 
reservations that NCTC is primarily an intelligence focused entity and does not inherently 
have the “results endgame mentality” critical to lead such a group. FBI Deputy Assistant 
Director James McJunkin expressed this same concern with the caveat that an 
experienced “operator” with the knowledge and track record of achieving endgame 
results would need to lead such an organization (McJunkin, 2009).  McJunkin also 
expressed that there are still considerable turf battles and a reluctance to cooperate from 
some members of the counterterrorism community.  Some, as former FBI Assistant 
Director Michael Heimbach, have expressed the concern regarding the NCTC Director’s 
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dual reporting requirements which includes reporting directly to the Director of National 
Intelligence on matters of counterterrorism intelligence analysis 
The apprehension stems from placing the NCTC Director in a direct reporting 
chain, albeit not an operational one, that is unduly influenced by an intelligence 
community that is still struggling to fully understand what the other members of the 
counterterrorism community bring in terms of endgame options (Heimbach, 2009). Those 
such as Cummings, Heimbach and senior officials at the Department of Defense agree 
that such an interagency organization should be intelligence driven, but it does not have 
to be intelligence led.  Most importantly, it must be an independent, standalone entity that 
will consider all options equally in achieving endgame results (Cummings, Heimbach, 
Cowhig, DoD Official, personal communication, August 3, 2009).     
3. Modifying NCTC to Meet the Challenge 
For NCTC to become the central strategy planning and operations body that the 
counterterrorism community needs, the Director of NCTC must possess the power to task 
and direct the participating agencies.  Going beyond this, NCTC should have the ability 
to review policy and procedures of all the counterterrorism community participants while 
evaluating the equities of everyone involved.  Violations of the accepted policies and 
procedures must have consequences (McJunkin, 2009).  The Director of NCTC must 
become a central player in the counterterrorism fight beyond just the coordination of 
intelligence analysis specific to terrorism.   
The NCTC Director, who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate, should be selected as an expert who is well versed in the interagency 
counterterrorism arena.  Taking a page from the book of the DoD’s Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the head of NCTC should be rotated among principal participating 
agencies and serve a five-year minimum, 10-year maximum term, similar to the Director 
of the FBI, to avoid or mitigate any issues of political influence.  The Director of NCTC, 
via his Director and Deputy Director for Strategic Planning and Operations, would be 
responsible for the national counterterrorism program with all the elements of national 
power available to achieve desired outcomes.  As stated by Cummings, “trying to operate 
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by consensus always results in watered-down concepts and plans. Instead, we need to 
assign responsibility and hold agencies and people accountable.  One guy in charge, 
utilizing everyone else’s elements of national power....now that’s purple” (Cummings, 
2009).  
In 2007, NCTC established the Senior Interagency Strategy Team (SIST) to serve 
as the forum to solicit interagency inputs, broker compromises and determine if agencies 
were able and willing to relinquish control of legacy missions or take on new 
responsibilities (Maguire, 2008).  Since NCTC can serve as the foundation of the needed 
stand-alone counterterrorism body, the SIST can be the vital instrument where the all the 
interagency capabilities and skills are marshaled to develop coordinated plans with end 
game results.  One significant difference with the current SIST is that members 
representing each agency would be executive level (SES and Flag officer) personnel 
assigned as permanent staff to NCTC for a period not less than two years.  This 
recommendation will maintain a level of consistency that will be less susceptible to 
changes brought on by new political administrations. It will also allow these executive 
leaders to take this high-level interagency experience back to their parent agencies as 
they prepare to ascend to higher levels of leadership and authority.  The supporting staff 
requirements would also be met from interagency personnel for two to three years tours.  
These recommendations borrow directly from the successful JIATF-S model where buy 
in and a sense of ownership in the plans and operations has led to 20 years of seamless 
integration.  With guidance provided by the Director of NCTC, the SIST, led by the 
Director and Deputy Director of Strategic Operations, will develop the national strategic 
counterterrorism plans and determine the requirements each agency will need in carrying 
out their assignments. At the conclusion of the process, once a fully coordinated strategic 
plan is in place, the Director of NCTC can then report to the President and the National 
Security Council for review and approval (Maguire, 2009).   
A modified NCTC SIST can also be instrumental in creating interagency 
counterterrorism policy and doctrine that will shape and guide the U.S. counterterrorism 
operations going forward.  As discussed in Chapter III, in response to the Christmas Day 
2009 attempting bombing, President Obama  directed NCTC to, “establish and resource 
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appropriately a process to prioritize and to pursue thoroughly and exhaustively terrorism 
threat threads, to include the identification of appropriate follow up action by the 
intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security communities [emphasis added]” 
(White House, 2010). However, without the authority to direct the necessary follow up to 
terrorism threat streams, history shows that institutional inertia by the agencies in the 
counterterrorism community will make NCTC’s task daunting at the very least.   
a. Utilizing the DoD Reorganization Example 
The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 brought 
sweeping changes to the U.S. military’s ability to organize, plan and execute its mission. 
It initiated significant changes to the command structure of the United States military by 
increasing the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who now serves as the 
principal military adviser to the President and the National Security Council (NSC). The 
act also increased the ability of the Chairman to direct overall strategy and provided 
greater command authority to “unified” and “specified” field commanders (Pub L. 99–
433).  The success of this effort is exemplified in the accomplishments achieved in 
Operations Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.  The creation and 
application of similar legislation that bestows many of the same authorities to the 
Director of NCTC would be instrumental in advancing the counterterrorism community 
in the same manner.   
Just as in Goldwater-Nichols, the counterterrorism community would 
participate in shared procurement.  The Director of NCTC would control the purse strings 
for the allocation of funding and resources pertaining to the counterterrorism mission 
requirements as outlined in the joint plans develop by the SIST and approved by the 
President and NSC.  This control of funding and resources would mitigate some of the 
competition between agencies while providing the NCTC Director with significant 
leverage to ensure interagency compliance with assigned tasks.  While the Director of 
NCTC would be able to direct agencies operations to support the joint plans, he would 
not dictate or micromanage the agencies on how to carry out the operations.  Just as the  
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs does not apply command over the execution of military 
operations, the Director of NCTC would allow the respective agencies to execute their 
mission assignments. 
4. The Process for Making the NCTC Solution Happen 
To activate the process and create this modified counterterrorism 
megacommunity, will be the presence of strong leadership.  When considering the vital 
nature of America’s security and the number of different government agencies involved, 
the one position that possesses the power and weight to bring this process together is the 
Office of the President.  The President must function in the role of a kingpin who 
provides direction and guides the process.  Furthermore, the White House will draft and 
push the legislation required to grant NCTC the authority to exercise the “collaborative 
thuggery” needed to capitalize on the “spirit of collaboration” that already exists (Bryson, 
2004).11  Beneath the President, “champions” who share the vision to have a successful 
central strategic counterterrorism organization, will be necessary.  Ideally, the champions 
will be the directors of the participating agencies who will bring their respective 
designees to shepherd the process through each respective organization.  
Additionally, as described in Kim’s Blue Ocean Strategy, it is important to 
recognize the need to identify the cohorts—those who will benefit and ally with the plan, 
and the scoundrels—those who perceive a loss of clout, funding or power and will 
oppose the plan if not sabotage it (Kim, 2005).  The President must effectively 
communicate and demonstrate to the executive leadership of these organizations that the 
functional increased capacity each will gain within its organizational realms, that each 
will not be diminished but in fact will each play a greater role in coalescing the national 
counterterrorism strategy.  It must also be communicated that counterterrorism 
                                                 
11 Based on the Theory of Collaborative Advantage (TOCA) the “Spirit of Collaboration” is the idea 
of involving, embracing and mobilizing participating agencies to attain common desired outcomes.  It can 
be argued that a spirit of collaboration surely exists in the U.S. counterterrorism community (Bryson, 
2004).  TOCA also recognizes the reality of “Collaborative Inertia” brought about by self interest, cultural 
stubbornness and politics (Bryson). In order to achieve significant results worthy of the effort expended, 
there is the need for “Collaborative Thuggery” to overcome the individual agendas and politics each 
participant brings to the table (Bryson). 
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operational funding and resources will be allocated by NCTC based on function and 
responsibility and not by agency.  Hence, the coordinated strategic plans developed at 
NCTC will have teeth to compel the agencies to execute their assigned tasks as outlined 
by the plans.  Most importantly, the message must focus on accomplishing the shared 
goals and common strategic end game mission—that of protecting the nation from the 
modern day terrorism threat.  By converting even just a few scoundrels into cohorts, a 
powerful stable of champions will emerge to counter the remaining detractors to the 
NCTC plan.   
Kim also recommends identifying a consigliore, a highly respected insider who 
can advise of the pitfalls and likely difficulties in making the execution strategy work.  
The consigliore would also work to exert influence over the scoundrels in the equation by 
bringing them along in the process and giving them confidence that their concerns are 
heard and best accommodated.  Retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin 
Powell and former FBI Director Louis Freeh are examples of the high-profile and well-
respected individuals who would be accepted as competent and fair to all those involved.  
Considering the stakeholders involved, it would be wise to retain two consigliores.  One 
who would work within the counterterrorism community, while a second with 
considerable experience in the drafting and passage of security legislation could work on 
the legislative side.  Suggestions for these positions could be former Congressman Lee 
Hamilton who co-chaired the 9/11 Commission and well-respected former Senator Fred 
Thompson. 
The stakeholders must understand that the concept of a central counterterrorism 
authority at NCTC will enhance respective ability to meet their mission assignments 
while providing success in meeting the collective national goal.  By creating a Joint 
Chiefs/JIATF-S entity to bring together all the elements of national power will increase 
the nation’s ability to protect itself and mitigate the threat posed to it. 
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5. Pros and Cons of the NCTC Solution 
a. Pros 
In order to effectively develop and implement cohesive strategic plans that 
seek a defined and agreed upon endgame result requires all participants to fully buy-in 
and possess ownership of the process as much as the outcome.  This recommendation 
capitalizes on the existing NCTC foundation and structure that has already been heavily 
invested.  Why reinvent the wheel and create yet another agency when NCTC already 
seeks to implement what the counterterrorism community needs.  This recommendation 
utilizes the success exemplified in the JIATF-S model, with a 20-year track record to 
support its cause, and the changes made by the innovative Goldwater-Nichols Defense 
Reorganization Act as the basis for the modifications that need to be put into practice at 
NCTC.    
Better coordination and planning among the interagency partners under 
the firm direction of an experienced director would facilitate the use of classified 
information as evidence because all the planning regarding the use of that information 
would be done on the front end and not after the fact.  The battle of wills between the 
intelligence and law enforcement elements of community would be more effectively 
resolved at the start and would also permit the intelligence agencies to expect and prepare 
for a legal outcome of the operation.  In addition, it will allow for better alignment of the 
resources and the selected elements of national power that will be put into play when 
targeting high value terrorism subjects.  
As an example, had there been coordinated plan on how to deal with Jose 
Padilla, regardless of how or where he was captured, then his designation as an enemy 
combatant or the use of the ineffectually material witness warrant would not have been 
necessary. The same case can currently be made for terrorism subjects such as Adam 
Ghadan, Adnan El-Shukrajuma and even Usama Bin Laden.  The development of 
different courses of action in pursuing an endgame strategy for each gives each 
interagency partner ample opportunity to prepare and execute their part of the plan.  It 
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also gives the U.S. government more flexibility to execute operations depending on what 
circumstance may be present when the opportunity arises. 
b. Cons 
There will likely be strong institutional resistance from many of the 
interagency participants who will perceive a loss of autonomy and power.  Unwilling 
participants will make the transition to a new structure challenging and even cumbersome 
in the beginning.  There will be political resistance from congressional members and 
oversight committees who will jockey for position on the right to control the NCTC purse 
strings. Other committees and congressional members will lament any loss of power or 
control and seek to prevent such changes from affecting their positions.  In addition, the 
current Director of NCTC Michael Leiter is unproven and will have to quickly 
demonstrate his capability to meet the challenge of leading a disparate interagency 
community with different mindsets and institutional inertia.  The coordination and 
direction of counterterrorism operations will have to be reviewed to ensure the best 
courses of action are prepared and ready to be executed.  This will require the inputs, 
concerns and requirements from all participants as well as the identification and 
assignment of SES level personnel from each agency, which may not be accomplished 
quickly. 
6. Summary Endgame Recommendation 
Utilize the heavily invested existing NCTC infrastructure as a standalone body to 
fully coordinate and integrate the strategic planning and mission execution of the 
counterterrorism community.  Utilize the success demonstrated by the JIATF-S model by 
committing resources and senior ranking personnel for permanent assignment in key 
positions under the Director of NCTC.  This will create a sense of ownership, increase 
trust and loosen the umbilical cord to parent organizations while integrating all 
capabilities of national power in an effective and efficient manner.  Increase the authority 
of the NCTC Director in a similar manner that the Goldwater-Nichols Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 did for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Increase 
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the ability of the NCTC Director to not only conduct joint strategic counterterrorism 
planning but also direct overall strategic operations by providing greater command 
authority to a unified counterterrorism interagency community.  Provide the NCTC 
Director with control of funding and resource allocation pertaining to the mission 
requirements outlined in the strategic plans for each participating agency.  The creation of 
this central counterterrorism organization will outline the strategic plans to destroy or 
disrupt terrorist organizations while developing specific courses of action targeting 
terrorist organizations and the key high value leaders and operatives.  Through integrated 
planning, these coordinated courses of action will facilitate full integration of national 
assets and ensure that information obtained in the course of counterterrorism operations is 
collected, handled and preserved, from the outset, in a manner in which it can be used in 
a judicial prosecution tailored to Article III or Military Commission.    
B. RECOMMENDATION 2: INSTITUTE A LEGAL U.S. PREVENTATIVE 
DETENTION SYSTEM UTILIZING THE FISA COURT 
As discussed in previous chapter, the furious debate over the existence of the 
Guantanamo Bay prison and the disposition of the terrorist subjects housed there 
continues to rage. With some of the world’s most dangerous terrorists in custody, 
extracting information that can lead to the pre-emption of attacks, the apprehension of 
other terrorist members and produce critical evidence is essential.  As shown in the case 
study analysis, terrorist operatives such as Jose Padilla, Richard Reid and Farouk Abdul 
Mutallab must be exploited to meet the pre-emption priority.  Their cases also 
demonstrated the requirement to have available the statements of other terror operatives 
who have also been exploited while in preventative detention in order to secure 
substantive convictions.  The most recent cases of “Underwear Bomber” Farouk Abdul 
Mutallab12 and the premature arrest of Najibullah Zazi13 further strengthens the argument 
                                                 
12 Mutallab is a Nigerian Al Qaeda operative who attempted to blow up Northwest Flight 253 on 
December 25, 2009 by concealing an IED in his underwear (DeYoung & Fletcher, 2010).  
13 Zazi is a U.S. citizen who was arrested on September 19, 2009 for reportedly conspiring to carry out 
attacks against the New York City subway system.  The arrest of Zazi and search warrants executed on 
September 20, 2009 were reportedly a result of deconfliction problems between federal authorities and 
local law enforcement (Sheehan, 2009).   
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of the need for the U.S. to have this counterterrorism tool in its tool box.  In order to meet 
the criteria laid out by President Obama, the following recommendations will help 
achieve the endgame and answer the question of whether preventative detention can fit 
into the virtues of a free democratic society.   
1. Dispelling the Misconception, a U.S. Preventative Detention System Is 
Possible 
As previously discussed in Chapter IV, one of the most misunderstood 
perceptions is that the U.S. Constitution prevents the government from arresting and 
detaining an individual for more than 48 hours before that person must be presented to a 
magistrate.  The misperception is that in order for the government to hold a detained 
person for longer than 48 hours would require a change to the Constitution itself.  
However, analysis by Constitutional scholars, including renowned Professors John Yoo 
and Richard Posner, clearly show that the 48 hour rule was established through the 
interpretation of the Supreme Court pertaining to case law touching on the due process 
clauses in the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments.  The analysis by Yoo and Posner 
show there is nothing explicitly stated in the Constitution that would prohibit a balanced 
preventative detention system so long as Congress passed legislation authorizing its 
existence.   
2. Developing a Preventative Detention Framework That Meets 
Disruption, Intelligence Collection and Prosecution Requirements 
Scrutiny of the current U.S. response to this complex issue reveals a reliance on a 
patchwork of pre-9/11 laws that are ill designed to meet the modern day terrorist threat.  
These laws are geared for issues relating to material witnesses, immigration and enemy 
combatants in a traditional war between nations.  This thesis espouses the need to 
develop a coherent legal architecture with adequate procedures to provide a tool for 
disruption and deal with the interaction of intelligence information and the judicial 
system.  The next step is to construct a legal framework that will clearly lay out how it 
will meet the short-term requirements of disruption and intelligence collection but also 
meet the long-term endgame requirement of prosecution.   
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Drawing upon the British and Israeli models, the Brookings Institute’s Benjamin 
Wittes and Heritage Foundation’s James Carafano each provide an excellent outline as to 
what an American preventative detention system would resemble.  Wittes’s vision 
suggests the detention system would only be for non-criminal disruption purposes.  
Carafano strongly lays out the practical and tactical necessity of utilizing preventative 
detention to obtain critical intelligence information from the detainee.  This thesis will 
bring together a practical and strong recommendation that fuses the elements of 
disruption, intelligence collection and prosecution.  As discussed at length in Chapter IV, 
America’s situation is not unique.  The U.K. and Israel are among those who face similar 
terrorist threats and have developed legal preventative detention structures that permit the 
government to act upon intelligence information while also ensuring the existence of 
burden of proof standards, procedural protections and oversight (Carafano & 
Rosenzweig, 2004). 
a. The Wittes Preventative Detention Framework 
In a 2009 paper for the Brookings Institute, Wittes provides an excellent 
proposed preventative detention model.  Wittes’s model attempts to move away from the 
laws of war paradigm, which has governed the enemy combatant debate, so that the 
executive branch will maintain its exclusive legal privilege to detain those caught on the 
battlefield until hostilities are over.  Wittes’s model also seeks to provide the executive 
branch with an option to criminal detention should the evidence not be sufficient to 
charge a detainee immediately following his arrest.  Under Wittes’s plan, should the 
government seek the preventative detention option, it could, with certification of the 
Attorney General, arrest and hold a detainee for a maximum of 14 days before needing to 
notify and seek judicial authorization for further detention (Wittes, 2009).  The 14-day 
period permits the government from publicly disclosing the arrest to allow for the 
apprehension of associates or to not expose operations that could be compromised by the 
news of the detainee’s capture.  Should the government wish to continue with detention 
beyond 14 days, it must petition the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia to 
issue a detention order under the authority that the model law grants.  If the District Court 
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approves the government’s petition, the court issues an order authorizing the detainee to 
be held for up to six months.  This process may be repeated every six months until the 
government or the court determines that the detainee no longer meets the criteria 
established in the law or until the government transfers the individual for trial, release or 
to foreign custody (Wittes, 2009). 
Under Wittes’s model, those who could be subject to detention are non-
U.S. persons who are identified to be (1) an agent of a foreign power, if (2) that power is 
one against which Congress has authorized the use of force, and if (3) the actions of the 
covered individual in his capacity as an agent of the foreign power poses a danger both to 
any person and to the interests of the United States.  This precept borrows directly from 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which delineates who is subject to 
authorized FISA court surveillance.  The government, at this juncture, only needs to 
articulate a “reasonable suspicion” that an individual meets the above criteria.  Upon the 
government petitioning the District Court for prolonged detention, the detainee is 
afforded counsel who is cleared to receive and handle classified information.  The 
detainee at this juncture is also informed as to the reason for his detention and the ability 
to contest the detention before the court at the six-month mark.  The burden of proof for 
the petition falls upon the government who may utilize hearsay evidence but must also 
adhere to discovery obligations to the cleared defense counsel as principally found in 
current habeas courts (Wittes, 2009).   
b. Recommendations for Modifying the Wittes Model  
(1). The system would include U.S. persons. While Wittes’s model 
is a good framework from which to begin, there are critical missing elements.  One 
element in Wittes’s presentation is his model law that would only apply to non-U.S. 
persons, meaning those who are not considered U.S. citizens nor have permanent resident 
alien status.  While Wittes’s intention to restrict the preventative detention regime to 




make it initially more palatable, the case of Jose Padilla, Najibullah Zazi or the potential 
future arrests of Adnan El Shukrajuma, Adam Ghadan and Abu Mansour Al-Amriki, all 
U.S. citizens, reveal a significant gap.   
As presented in Chapter III, in the case of Padilla, intelligence 
obtained from the interrogation of other senior Al Qaeda detainees and documents 
recovered in Afghanistan clearly indicated Padilla, a U.S. citizen, had been tasked to 
return to the U.S. to carry out a catastrophic terror attack targeting civilians.  His arrest 
and subsequent detention and interrogation, while controversial, revealed the full extent 
of the plot and significant intelligence on Al Qaeda and other members of the 
organization.  In the case of Zazi, a substantial summary of media reports have indicated 
strong links to Al Qaeda, a sophisticated plot to attack the New York City subway system 
and that his arrest was premature due to unintended complications with local law 
enforcement activities (Baker, 2009).  Assuming the U.S. is fortunate in executing the 
capture of El-Shukrajuma, Gadan and Abu Mansour, all U.S. citizens assessed to have 
significant contact with senior Al Qaeda leaders, the critical need to extract the 
intelligence they are believed to possess would be of the highest priority.   
A good solution to filling this gap would be a more stringent set of 
criteria when dealing with the preventative detention of a U.S. person.  Instead of needing 
only the Attorney General’s certification to execute the arrest and initial detention, the 
case and intelligence information would need to be presented to Federal Judge for review 
and authorization.  The individual must:  
1. Determined to be an agent of a foreign power;   
2. The foreign power is one in which Congress has authorized 
the use of force;   
3. The actions of the individual in his capacity as an agent of 
the foreign power poses a danger both to any person and to 
the interests of the United States.   
(2)  The system must have emergency authorization capability.  In 
the instance of an emergency situation in order to prevent an eminent attack, the 
government would follow the same procedure as it does in obtaining emergency FISA 
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authority whereby the Attorney General provides the emergency authorization but the 
case must be presented to the FISA court within 72 hours.  In the case of an emergency 
preventative detention request, the requirement would be more stringent by forcing the 
government to go before the court in 48 hours.  If the court denies the authorization due 
to lack of meeting the criteria previously outlined, the authority is immediately rescinded 
and the subject set free.  
(3)  The system would provide an initial 25-day detention period, 
six-month judicial review and a two-year limit.  Wittes’s model suggests a 14-day period 
of detention prior to notifying the court or the arrest being made public.  However, as 
mentioned in Chapter II, typically the time needed to coordinate with interagency 
partners and foreign intelligence services regarding the use of classified information in 
any type of judicial setting can be very challenging.  Furthermore, while Wittes suggests 
that his model would not be intended for the purpose of intelligence collection from the 
detainee, having a known terrorist in custody without soliciting the details of potential 
attacks would be unpardonable.   
Extending the initial detention period from 14 days to 25 days 
would provide the government with valuable added time to coordinate the facilitation of 
such classified information to perhaps bolster its case for authorized detention.  
Additionally, it is recommended that the model law bring the review of the court in from 
the start so that absent an emergency situation, judicial inclusion and oversight is present 
from the beginning.  The 25-day period would be reasonable by falling in-between the 
U.K. and Israeli models and the notification of a cleared defense counsel can still be 
maintained at the 14- or 15-day mark so that counsel can have roughly 10 days to review 
the discoverable information prior to meeting with his client.  The 25-day window would 
also provide the government a reasonable, though not ideal, amount of time to conduct 
focused interrogation of the detainee without outside influence or distraction.  The 
statements made by the detainee during this 25-day period prior to meeting with his 
cleared counsel would not be admissible in a criminal court unless the detainee agrees to 
waive his Miranda rights.   
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As demonstrated in Chapter III, Richard Reid agreed to waive his 
Miranda rights and valuable intelligence was obtained by the FBI prior to Reid’s initial 
appearance in court roughly 36 hours later.  If the detainee refuses to waive his rights, he 
can still be interrogated for intelligence purposes but admissible statements will need to 
be captured via a “clean team” for his prosecution.  A “clean team”14 will need to 
duplicate or obtain the same incriminating statements from the detainee but without 
having the knowledge benefit of the interrogation results obtained during the intelligence-
gathering phase.  However, any incriminating statements regarding other terrorism 
subjects can be utilized in their potential future prosecutions.  For the purpose of 
maintaining the prosecutive endgame, the interrogation techniques utilized that result in 
incriminating statements from the detainee would be limited to those authorized for law 
enforcement purposes.   
If the government chooses to maintain the subject in preventative 
detention beyond 25 days, the government must: 1) make the subject’s arrest public; 2) 
return to the court every six months for judicial review and approval to extend the 
detention.  At the two-year mark, the government must formally charge the subject, 
transfer him to a country with pending charges, or release him.  If the subject is found 
guilty in a judicial proceeding, the amount of time in preventative detention will count as 
time served against his imposed sentence.    
(4)  The system would utilize the FISA Court.  Finally, while 
Wittes places the Federal District Court in Washington D.C. as the situate for such a 
regime, the anticipated heavy use of classified information makes the modification and 
use of the already existing FISA court a much more suitable venue.  The FISA court 
already has a cadre of congressionally approved judges who are cleared to handle the 
most sensitive and highly classified information and are well versed in the above-
                                                 
14 The term “Clean Team” refers to a team of law enforcement agents, typically FBI agents, who will 
engage with a detained terrorism subject only at the conclusion of the interrogation of the detained subject 
for intelligence collection purposes.  A Clean Team would be used when the detained subject originally 
refuses to waive his Miranda rights but his interrogation proceeds in an effort to collect intelligence 
information.  The Clean Team is not privy to the information or results of the intelligence interrogation of 
the subject and in essence must attempt to have the subject re-confess his statements assuming the detained 
subject agrees to waive his Miranda rights the second time afforded the opportunity (Suro, 1999).  
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mentioned precepts that are used to authorize FISA authority.  Utilizing an already 
existing legislatively authorized court, specifically built to protect U.S. national security, 
would go a long way to gaining acceptance with Congress and the American public.  As 
presented in Chapter IV, the French counterterrorism court is a similar national security 
venue to the U.S. FISA court and can be used as a model to further develop existing 
FISA court for the purposes of preventative detention.  While certainly different in their 
legal construct and approach, the French have successfully demonstrated that the concept 
of a national security court, possessing a cadre of cleared judges, prosecutors and defense 
attorneys permits for a much tighter fusion between intelligence, evidence and judicial 
due process that is highly effective and capable of protecting classified information while 
not jeopardizing criminal prosecution (Shapiro & Suzan, 2003).  The FISA court is well 
situated in Washington D.C. where the intelligence and federal law enforcement 
components of the counterterrorism community have quick access.   
The court will need to develop a cadre of cleared defense counsel, 
which can be raised from both the public and private ranks.  Those from the public ranks 
can come from within the Justice Department similar to a public defender’s office.  
Private attorneys who are willing to submit to the requisite background investigations to 
obtain Top Secret clearances would be able to make their services available to detained 
subjects.  A detained subject may also choose a cleared private counsel if the subject 
rejects the government's offer of free legal counsel. 
(5)  The system could implement a “cleared Grand Jury” concept.  
Since the proposition of a U.S. preventative detention system would be unique and 
perhaps contentious to the American mindset, then conceivably removing the initial 
preventative detention ruling by just one FISA court judge would be more acceptable.  
An alternative consideration could be in seating a “cleared Grand Jury” for preventative 
detention cases heard within the FISA court.  The concept lends to removing the initial 
decision from the hands of just one person to a larger pool of cleared citizens that could 
hear the evidence against a subject vice a single judge.  Once presented with the 
evidence, both classified and unclassified, should the “cleared Grand Jury” hand down a 
preventative detention order, much like a Grand Jury indictment, the government would 
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be authorized to detain the subject in question.  The FISA court judge would preside over 
the initial “cleared Grand Jury” process and would have the authority to review and grant 
additional periods of requested detention by the government.  A cleared jury pool to hear 
such cases can be drawn from the existing 3 million individuals who already maintain 
security clearances (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2009).   
These cleared individuals would be subject to “jury duty” as a 
condition and privilege of being granted such a clearance by the government.  The 
expected argument from critics would be that the jury is partial to the government due to 
the security clearance granted by the government. However, one only needs to consider 
the hundreds of thousands of individuals within a multitude of departments, state and 
local agencies in addition to the thousands of contractors who work for private 
organizations to understand the diversity such a jury pool would offer.  It can be 
effectively argued that a jury pool of three million persons from around the country, in 
many respects, is considerably greater and more diverse than most local jurisdictions in 
selecting a jury for criminal trials. 
(6)  The system will have a five-year sunset clause and regular 
congressional review.  Wittes is correct to recommend the requirement that the law 
contain a periodic sunset provision that will require Congress to evaluate the regime to 
determine if it needs to be modified, enhanced or is no longer needed.  Wittes suggests a 
three year review period; however, due to the fact locating and apprehending terrorist 
subjects is very difficult, an initial 5 year review will provide for a better opportunity to 
see the regime put into practice.  This sunset and evaluation concept is the same as has 
been done with the USA PATRIOT Act 
3. The Process for Making the U.S. Preventative Detention System 
Happen  
A vital and critical step would be to garner bipartisan support for such a 
modification to the American legal system.  The executive branch, led by the Attorney 
General, should recommend to the President the creation of a bi-partisan panel of former 
legislative, executive and judicial branch officials to study the proposed 
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recommendations presented below.  The panel should resemble the highly respected and 
effective 9/11 Commission model.  While the leading House and Senate officials for both 
parties from the Judiciary Committees should be participants to provide current 
congressional input, the purpose of having the majority of the committee not be sitting 
members is to de-politicize the process as much as possible so that careful and objective 
consideration can be accomplished.  This same technique was successful in providing 
effective and well-accepted recommendations to both the executive and legislative 
branches.  Though sitting members of the bench should not participate so as to not give 
the impression of creating law, retired members of the federal bench and respected 
constitutional scholars can provide expert judicial input.  This scenario is more likely to 
gain the confidence of the American public when the debate within the nation takes 
place.  
4. Pros and Cons of a Legal U.S. Preventative Detention System  
a. Pros 
The greatest benefit of establishing a legal preventative detention system 
would be the addition of a powerful counterterrorism tool in protecting the American 
public from terrorist attack by disrupting plots prior to their execution.  It also 
incapacitates terrorist subjects so they cannot return to the battlefield and pose a risk to 
society.  This system provides counterterrorism officials with the opportunity to extract 
critical intelligence from terrorist subjects to additionally identify other members, their 
plots and develop operations in order to neutralize their efforts.  This system creates the 
opportunity to develop evidence for the prosecution of terrorism subjects so they meet 
justice and are no longer a threat to the nation.  This construct provides for a fair and 
reasonable means of preventative detention that includes rigorous oversight, participation 
by all three branches of government and the American public.  This system does not 
require a change to the U.S. Constitution and lies within the power of the legislative 
process to become law.  The inclusion of the sunset/evaluation clause forces the system 
to be examined by the lawmaking body and places its continued existence directly in its 
power.   
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b. Cons 
The objection to a U.S. preventative detention system will be its departure 
from accepted norm created by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the due process 
clauses within Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments.  Overcoming the objections of those 
who believe in a perceived constitutional right will be challenging.  The use of the FISA 
court, while advantageous based on its history, is still unproven in this context, which 
raises concerns as to its viability.  The creation of a cadre of cleared defense counsel will 
be time consuming and challenging as well as the consideration that an expansion of 
FISA court may also be necessary.  The issue of where detained terrorism subjects will be 
physically held must be addressed, since the overseas arrest of non-U.S. persons can 
create issues relating to immigration and requests for asylum by those individuals. The 
means by which potential cleared Grand Jury members are summonsed and selected must 
be determined. 
5. Summary Endgame Recommendation 
This recommendation meets all the critical criteria of:  
1. preventing attacks through disruption and incapacitation;  
2. providing a platform for the collection of actionable intelligence while;  
3. establishing a legal detention system that will allow for the intelligence 
collected from a subject in detention to be available as evidence for 
prosecution purposes.   
The construct of a U.S. preventative detention system would allow for an initial 
unpublicized 25-day detention period by authorization of the Attorney General for non-
U.S. persons while FISA court approval, perhaps via a cleared Grand Jury process, would 
be necessary for U.S. persons.  The government would be able to question the subject 
during the initial 25-day period to gain actionable intelligence, obtain evidence by 
advising of Miranda or pitch the subject to become a source for the U.S. government.  At 
the conclusion of the initial 25-day period, if the subject is maintained in custody his 
arrest will be publicized.  Any subject held in detention beyond 25 days would have his 
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case reviewed by the FISA court every six months not to go beyond two years at which 
time the government would have to either formally charge the subject, render him to a 
country that is in a position to prosecute or release him. A cleared defense counsel would 
be provided discovery at the 15-day mark.  Cleared defense counsel would be permitted 
to meet with the subject on the twenty-sixth day and represent his client at all future 
hearings before the FISA court regarding additional periods of detention.  If tried and 
convicted in Federal Article III criminal court or Military Commission any sentence 
imposed on a guilty subject would have his time in preventative detention mitigated from 
that sentence.  The preventative detention system would be subject to a five-year sunset 
clause for the debate to begin anew as to the system’s continued usefulness or needed 
modifications.   
In August 2009, National Security Advisor John Brennan declared a change in the 
terminology to adequately depict the threat facing the U.S. (White House, 2009). No 
longer termed the Global War on Terror, Brennan announced the effort would more 
specifically be addressed as the Global War on Al Qaeda (White House, 2009). While 
this change perhaps provides a better definition and focus, the accepted reality is that the 
threat posed by Al Qaeda and likeminded groups will continue for some time into the 
future.  If the U.S. is to effectively protect its citizens and national interests while firmly 
remaining within its celebrated values of due process, transparency and balance of power, 
then a legal preventive detention system based on the framework outlined above must be 
considered.  The President and Congress must engage the American people in the debate 
and present what an acceptable regime would entail.  Only through the acceptance by the 
American public will such an endeavor be successful.  In order to gain the acceptance of 
the American public, the President must lead by inviting congressional leaders in calling 
for and establishing a bi-partisan 9/11 style committee to develop the final constructs of a 
legal preventative detention system.  The committee should also be provided with a 
proposed model of what the legal construct would look like and clearly outline what 
requirements it must meet to be effective.  This recommendation provides that model. 
 95
C. RECOMMENDATION 3:  FULL INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION OF 
FBI AND SOCOM  
The opportunities for the prosecution of foreign terrorism subjects are increasing.  
Captured terrorist operatives recovered from the battlefield, ungoverned lawless areas 
and foreign countries are rightfully seen as a potential wealth of actionable intelligence.  
However, as presented in Chapter III, much of the best and most accurate intelligence 
information is often precluded from use in the existing U.S. Federal Article III criminal 
justice system. This occurs due to the sensitivity of how the intelligence information is 
obtained but is also based on current judicial procedure and rules of evidence (Mukasey, 
2007).  This third recommended action identifies a means by which U.S. counterterrorism 
community can capitalize on an existing proof of concept to better integrate inherent 
capabilities and elements of national power.  Enacting this third recommendation will 
facilitate gaining actionable intelligence while mitigating, to the greatest extent possible, 
the exclusion of that same information as prosecutive evidence.   
1. Threats of Purpose, Threats of Context and National Strategy 
Objectives 
In a June 2009 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS), Nathan Freier discusses the challenge the U.S. faces with present and future 
security environments that will be dominated by defense-relevant “unconventional” 
threats, but which also lay outside of traditional warfighting boundaries (Freier, 2009).  
Freier assesses the unconventional challenges will be a hybrid threat comprised of 
“threats of purpose” and “threats of context.”15  These continually morphing, 
unconventional, hybrid threats place limits on the use of traditional military power, and 
force the development and use of alternatives to fill the gaps in non-military capacity.  
Freier discusses how threats of purpose (terrorist groups) have conjoined and taken 
advantage of threats of context (ungoverned/under-governed sanctuary) to create the 
complex security environment with which the U.S. must contend.  The present and future 
                                                 
15 Freier (2009) defines “threats of purpose” as those that emanate from state or quasi-state actors, 
while “threats of context” are those arising unguided from the environment itself (i.e., failed states or 
ungoverned areas). 
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security environment requires a strategic approach that will blend military and non-
military capabilities.  While the new security environment and the hybrid threats it 
presents will continue to require a substantial military role, the U.S. must employ a 
variety of effective counterterrorism tools in response (Freier, 2009).  In essence, hybrid 
unconventional threats require a hybrid unconventional response.  
Freier’s supposition aligns with assumptions two and three outlined in Chapter I.  
Strategically, the U.S. has come to recognize the need for greater integration of 
capabilities and the roles assigned to meet the unconventional hybrid threats.  This is 
buoyed by the creation of NCTC, which is responsible for the strategic operational 
counterterrorism planning that seeks to integrate all elements of national power.  This 
planning is manifested in the National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror (NIP).  
As previously stated, the focus of the NIP is to eliminate overlap, set priorities and better 
balance the nation's counterterrorism strategy by infusing the military approach with law 
enforcement and diplomacy campaigns, which are seen as critical to long-term success.  
Within half a dozen broad objectives and more focused sub-objectives, the NIP 
designates lead and subordinate agencies to carry out a number of counterterrorism tasks 
(DeYoung, 2006).  Among them are:  
1. Maintaining the capacity to execute military operations wherever 
necessary to deter terrorists from attacking the homeland or to intercept 
and defeat terrorist threats at a safe distance from U.S. borders;  
2. Terrorist threats and plans are detected and neutralized by penetrating and 
dismantling their networks through the integration of intelligence and law 
enforcement investigations;  
3. Prompt law enforcement action against the perpetrators of terrorist actions 
through the integration of all pertinent resources for prompt identification 
and apprehension. (NIP, 2004)  
The 2006 Department of Defense (DoD) National Military Strategic Plan for the 
War on Terrorism (NMSP/WOT) aligns and supports the objectives outlined by NCTC in 
the NIP.  Produced through the Office of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
NMSP/WOT seeks to:  
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1. thwart or defeat terrorist actions against the U.S. and its allies,  
2. attack and disrupt international terrorist networks abroad,  
3. deny terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction,  
4. combat terrorism and deny terrorists safe havens (NMSP/WOT, 2006) The 
NMSP/WOT recognizes that the U.S. can only succeed in its fight to 
protect the homeland and defeat terrorist threats through cooperation with 
other U.S. government agencies to include integrating inherent 
interagency capabilities (NMSP/WOT, 2006).    
The NCTC and NMSP/WOT objectives, coupled with Freier’s discussion of the 
hybrid threats posed in the modern day security environment, require an innovative 
strategy to meet those threats and provide long-term “end game” solutions.  As presented 
in assumption two and supported by Freier, terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda 
(threats of purpose) will continue to seek and utilize ungoverned areas (threats of context) 
such as the areas in Afghanistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of 
Pakistan or East Africa in Somalia.  The pursuit of the most senior and significant 
terrorist actors will be a priority of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy.  When the U.S. 
intelligence community is successful in locating these terrorist operatives, the decision to 
utilize U.S. military assets is almost exclusively the preview of the special operations 
units (SOUs) of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to execute the 
capture/kill mission.   
These top tier SOCOM units have carried out these high level and sensitive 
missions throughout the War on Terror (GlobalSecurity, 2009).  The September 2009 
elimination of senior Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab leader Saleh Ali Nabhan, utilizing 
SOCOM forces, perfectly encapsulates all of the points discussed above (Fishel, 2009; 
Gettleman & Schmitt, 2009).  Shortly following the invasion into Afghanistan, law 
enforcement capabilities were brought to the battlefield by having FBI special agents 
integrate, on a limited basis, with SOMCOM SOUs (Southworth & Tanner, 2002).  
Expanding the existing ad hoc relationship by fully and permanently integrating FBI 
expertise into the SOCOM mission set will further assist in meeting the NIP and 
NMSP/WOT objectives by creating a hybrid unconventional solution to Freier’s complex 
unconventional security environment. 
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2. Bringing the Law Enforcement Capability to the Special Operations 
Mission 
The recommend presented in this thesis is a departure from the temporary or ad 
hoc basis of FBI integration with SOCOM SOUs.  The FBI and SOCOM each have 
maintained liaison positions (LNOs) at their respective headquarters since following 9/11 
(Bald, 2005).  The FBI has also embedded personnel with military units in Afghanistan 
and Iraq but has currently done so on an ad hoc basis (Mueller, 2007).  The permanent 
integration of FBI special agents within SOCOM SOUs will provide an inherent 
professional expertise in the execution of Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE), Battlefield 
Interrogation (BIT),16 biometrics collection and follow-on long-term interrogation.  It 
will also provide “legal and judicial” cover concerning establishing a chain-of-custody 
for the handling of potential evidence, acting as a possible arresting or seizing agent on 
the target and providing a testimonial capability in a courtroom. 
The manner of effectively coordinating the integration of FBI agents into 
SOCOM SOUs is a key factor to making this collaborative relationship successful.  
During an interview in July 2009, Captain Wyman Howard,17 a 20-year Naval Special 
Operations Officer, lauded the skill and professional expertise the FBI has brought to the 
special operations community.  Howard commented on the need for a national level 
commitment from both the FBI and the Department of Defense, in the form of a formal 
memorandum of agreement (MOA) that will bind the organizations to a fully integrated 
process (Howard, 2009).   
It is widely known that the selection and vetting process for U.S. special 
operations personnel is highly demanding and rigorous. This is due to the dangerous 
nature and importance of their mission assignments.  In this regard, the FBI and SOCOM 
                                                 
16 Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE): A related series of activities inside a captured sensitive site to 
exploit personnel, documents, electronic data, and other material located at the site, while neutralizing any 
threat posed by the occupants of the site or its contents (Vandal, 2005).  Battlefield Interrogation (BIT), the 
process of questioning a detainee of a military operation typically following the completion of hostile 
actions (Vandal).  Very similar to questioning an arrested criminal subject following a law enforcement 
action (Vandal). 
17 The views expressed by CAPT Howard are his own and do not represent the Office of the Secretary 
of Defence nor Special Operations Command. 
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will need to collaborate on the specific operational requirements SOCOM SOUs need 
from the FBI agents entering its ranks.  The organizations will need to establish selection 
criteria and a vetting process to ensure that the agents who will become part of the special 
operations package can meet the physical, mental and emotional expectations of these 
highly discriminating military units.  Coordination at the headquarters level utilizing the 
current FBI LNO assigned to SOCOMHQ and the SOCOM LNO assigned to the FBI 
Headquarters’ Counterterrorism Division can facilitate this aspect of the endeavor.   
a. Getting the Right Personnel in the Right Places 
The next step would be to create and assign permanent GS-14 level FBI 
LNO’s to each of the SOCOM component commands for a three-year assignment.  These 
FBI LNOs would work in coordination with the LNOs assigned to each respective 
headquarters and the selected agents coming in from the FBI field divisions.  The FBI 
LNOs would be responsible for and able to effectively coordinate the flow of FBI agents 
coming to the SOCOM component commands for two-year assignments.  The two-year 
assignment period will permit agents assigned to an SOU to remain with his SOU for a 
complete training cycle and overseas deployment.  By having the agents fully integrate 
and participate in the training cycle, the SOU personnel and the agents gain the benefit of 
training together, establishing standard operating procedures as well as roles and 
responsibilities prior to entering the battle space.  The LNOs principal focus would be to 
work daily with their respective component command’s training and operations 
departments and each of the SOUs to provide direct communication with the FBI agents 
who have been screened and selected to train and deploy with that particular SOU.  As 
opposed to the LNOs at the headquarters’ level, the FBI LNOs at the SOCOM 
component commands would have full visibility on current updates or changes to the 
training cycle, new capability and skill set requirements, and the ability to conduct 
quality control on the assigned agents while providing a direct line of communication for 
the commanding officer and senior FBI counterterrorism officials.  
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3. Pros and Cons of Full FBI and SOCOM Interagency Integration 
a. Pros 
The full integration of a law enforcement counterterrorism capability to 
the Special Operations community will meaningfully move the bar of prosecutive success 
in the right direction.  The ability of federal agents who can act as the collectors of 
damning evidence in addition to insulating SOU operators from having to testify bolsters 
the government’s ability to prosecute high value detainees like those held in Guantanamo 
Bay.  Office of Military Commission prosecutor Major Dan Cowhig strongly advocates 
for the entry of a federal law enforcement capability as early in the process as can be 
facilitated (Cowhig, 2009). Regarding the concept of fully integrating FBI agents with 
specialized military and intelligence units, Cowhig (2009) stated, “It would result in 
faster recognition of critical information and a greater accountability, organization and 
appreciation of physical evidence.”  Cowhig also felt participation of FBI provides for a 
better and cleaner testimonial capability (Cowhig, 2009).  Echoing Cowhig is Department 
of Justice senior litigation counsel John DePue.   
During an August 2009 interview, DePue stated that in terrorism cases the 
constitutional mandates that apply to material evidence are not so much attached to the 
material itself but to the manner the material is acquired (DePue, 2009). According to 
DePue, the national security methods on how potential evidentiary material is acquired 
must be protected and that the full integration of FBI with special operations is a good 
solution (DePue, 2009). By involving law enforcement at the front end of the operation 
there is a means to authenticate and testify to information from the outset without the 
need to re-create it after the fact (DePue, 2009).   
This multi-disciplinary incorporation utilizes the “whole of government 
approach” to strengthen the U.S. government’s ability to protect the homeland while 
serving to meet the objectives outlined in the NIP and NMSP/WOT.  It accomplishes 
these tasks through enhanced intelligence sharing and immediate access to information 
by the lead domestic counterterrorism agency, the FBI, to identify and disrupt threats 
directed at the U.S. homeland.  This recommended step will provide the U.S. 
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government’s premier terrorist hunters with a superior law enforcement, interrogation 
and evidence recovery capability.  It will increase the effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. 
counterterrorism missions by mitigating the potential loss of intelligence recovered 
during missions for use as evidence in follow-on judicial process.   
FBI agents, who are in a position to testify and can protect the identity of 
special forces operators, can better provide accountability in the process for the recovery 
of material discovered on targets and elicit information from captured subjects based on a 
century of experience.  FBI agents are also the only U.S. government officials who 
possess the unique capability of being both certified intelligence officers (Baginski, 2004) 
and sworn federal law enforcement officers.  This combination places them in an 
exceptional position to seek, collect, analyze and disseminate critical information to the 
intelligence community but also handle that same information in a manner suitable for 
use in a court of law.  By having permanent FBI LNOs at the SOCOM component 
commands, the Special Operations Community will gain greater confidence in the 
personal nature, mental, tactical and physical capability of the FBI agents who will 
become a part of the special operations package.  Furthermore, the LNOs and SOUs will 
be able to train and conduct quality control during the training preparation period prior to 
deploying overseas to hostile environments.  
b. Cons 
A potential negative impact could be in regards to personnel resourcing. 
The FBI is already experiencing a deficit of agents in trying to manage the national 
security mission in addition to the recent spike in white-collar crime associated with the 
failed mortgage crises (GAO, 2004; Pistole, 2009).  While the number of candidates 
seeking to fill the LNO and agent positions within the SOUs is expected to be robust, the 
concern revolves around attracting the right candidates who are qualified to meet the 
mission requirements.  There is also expected to be some debate and criticism, potentially 
in the political arena, that federal law enforcement agents are not trained or suited to 
operate with SOCOM special operations units.  A rebuttal to such a critique is that the 
FBI can draw on a sizeable number of agent personnel with extensive military 
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experience, many coming from the special operations community prior to coming to the 
FBI.  Furthermore, the FBI can draw on its trained cadre of field division SWAT agents 
and members of its national Hostage Rescue Team for personnel who have an inherent 
tactical, physical and mental constitution for just such type of work.   
Ultimately, this proposal seeks to eliminate just such a concern by having 
FBI counterterrorism agents screened, selected and trained to work alongside their 
SOCOM counterparts.  Additionally, there may be criticism that the aggressive military 
approach that has demonstrated an incredible amount of success will be altered and 
slowed to fit a more methodical law enforcement scheme. Many media commentators 
and political hacks have cried foul to indications that captured overseas terrorist subjects 
would be read Miranda warnings.  However, the intent of this recommendation is not to 
turn highly trained U.S. military special operations units into a law enforcement SWAT 
team on steroids but to enhance the special operations mission skill set and bring the law 
enforcement component to the front end of the counterterrorism mission.  Finally, as with 
any increase or reallocation of personnel resources, there will be the need for increased 
funding.  However, considering the counterterrorism mission is considered the top 
priority in the national security portfolio, a funding increase involving not more than 25 
agents per annum would be considered negligible. 
4. Summary Endgame Recommendation 
Create permanent FBI LNO positions at the SOCOM component combatant 
commands. Select and detail these LNOs for a three-year assignment. Establish through 
collaborative effort, SOCOM and FBI operational requirements for FBI agents that will 
be assigned to SOCOM special operations units.  Establish a selection and vetting process 
for FBI agents to be selected and assigned to SOCOM special operations units.  Select 
and assign an initial contingent of eight FBI special agents for a two-year period to 
SOCOM SOUs and integrate them into the training cycle for preparation to deploy 
overseas with their assigned SOU.   
This recommendation will help to address the NIP impediment outlined in 
Chapter I by establishing a permanent FBI counterterrorism law enforcement expertise 
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that will be fully integrated with tier-one SOCOM combat components during high-value 
missions.  This will provide the U.S. government’s premier terrorist hunters with a 
superior law enforcement, interrogation, evidence recovery, and testimonial capability 
while capitalizing on the synergy and effectiveness of the proven FBI and SOCOM 
relationship.  This recommendation will accelerate the transfer of vital intelligence 
information that indicates threats against the homeland to the lead U.S. domestic 
counterterrorism agency.  It will increase the effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. 
counterterrorism missions by mitigating the potential loss of intelligence recovered 
during missions for use as evidence during ensuing judicial process. This 
recommendation allows for the law enforcement end game option to be built at the front 
end of mission and run parallel to the intelligence part of the mission, eliminating the 
need to rebuild a case from scratch after the fact. Failure to address this issue could result 
in terrorist operatives being released and returning to the fight.     
D. SUMMARY 
The three recommendations presented in this chapter, 1) Establishing NCTC as a 
standalone counterterrorism organization with the power to plan and direct operations; 2) 
Establishing a legal U.S. preventative detention system and; 3) Fully and permanently 
integrating FBI and SOCOM, address the problem statement of this thesis by providing 
central leadership and a permanent interagency structure that strategically facilitates the 
proper collection, handling and disposition of classified intelligence information for use 
as evidence in the prosecution of terrorist subjects.  These recommendations also provide 
solutions to the gaps identified in the case studies of prosecuting terrorist subjects in 
Federal Article III criminal court.  These recommendations support the strategic 
objectives outlined in both the NIP and NMSP/WOT and provide unconventional hybrid 
solutions to the unconventional hybrid threats the nation faces.   
1. The first recommendation establishes a permanent central coordinating 
body and interagency structure that can strategically facilitate the proper 
collection, handling and disposition of classified intelligence information 
for use as evidence in the prosecution of terrorist subjects.    
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2. The second recommendation meets the challenges of the modern day 
terrorism threat by working within the seams of the intelligence, law 
enforcement and military schemes to prevent and disrupt attacks, collect 
intelligence and facilitate prosecution.   
3. The third recommendation brings together two elements of national 
power, federal law enforcement and military special operations, by 
integrating the inherent capabilities of two counterterrorism agencies, 
which will facilitate the collection and use of intelligence information as 
evidence for prosecution purposes.   
These recommendations include a comprehensive process for enacting each along 
with supporting observations, statements and commentary from subject matter experts to 
the principals each recommendation supports.  This thesis brings together practical and 
strong recommendations that fuse the essential elements of disruption, intelligence and 
prosecution.  The final chapter of this thesis will encapsulate its conclusions and the 
consequences of not following through with the bold and aggressive moves outlined to 
protect the nation and ensure the end game.   
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VI. CONCLUSION, CONSEQUENCES, AND QUESTIONS 
The issues discussed in this thesis are complex and considerable.  The issues 
range from the increased threat posed by international terrorism, military versus civilian 
jurisprudence, intelligence versus evidence and security versus freedoms.  A variety of 
factors such as perceived legal impossibilities, outdated government organization, agency 
protection of turf and legacy missions along with institutional resistance to change absent 
a crisis makes addressing the issues neither comfortable nor easy.  This thesis made four 
initial assumptions:  
1. The U.S. priority in confronting the terrorism conundrum will be to 
prevent attacks against the homeland, allies and overseas interests;   
2. Terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda will continue to seek and utilize 
lawless, ungoverned areas such as the FATA, East Africa/Somalia or 
Trans Sahara Africa to train, plan and execute attacks;   
3. As the battlefield and political landscapes continuously morph, the means 
by which the apprehension and disposition of terrorist operatives will also 
need to constantly adjust.  This assumption underscores the credence that 
approaching terrorism from solely a military, intelligence or law 
enforcement angle will ultimately be ineffective and result in further 
deadly attacks;   
4. The U.S. will continuously seek to impose the greatest and most 
substantial punishment, permitted by law, regarding the ultimate 
disposition of captured terrorist subjects.  The most important of these 
assumptions states that the first priority of the government and the 
counterterrorism community is to prevent the execution of terrorist attacks 
against the homeland.  This thesis has focused on ways to meet that 
priority while also resolving the problem of classified intelligence 
information being excluded for use as evidence in gaining the most 
substantive conviction possible against terrorist subjects.  The research, 
case studies, interviews and analysis conducted in this thesis have resulted 
in bold recommendations that, while not simple, are absolutely viable and 
supported with evidence that they will be effective.  This chapter will 
summarize the new situational dynamics of the terrorism threat facing the 
nation and the problem it has created in both protecting the nation while 
seeking fitting justice.  Finally, this chapter provides a summary of the 
recommended solutions, outlined in detail in Chapter V, to resolve those 
problems and poses unresolved questions outside the scope of this thesis. 
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A. THE STATE OF PLAY  
The advent of modern day terrorism, often associated with the 1972 Munich 
Olympics Israeli massacre, brought forth an evolution in the motivations, the mode of 
attacks and the means by which those attacks are carried out.  These successive events: 
 1983 bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut 
 1993 World Trade Center attack 
 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania 
 2000 attack on USS Cole  
 2001 9/11 attacks 
 2002 Bali bombing  
 2005 London train bombings and  
 2008 Mumbai attacks  
clearly demonstrate the evolution and changes in the international threat environment.  
The use of modern technology, such as high quality instantaneous worldwide 
communication, e-currency funds transfer, increasing access to previously unavailable 
information and contemporary international transportation, has made these quasi-national 
terrorist groups more threatening and difficult to deal with than at any point in U.S. 
history.  Throughout the nation’s 233 years of existence, it has, on one hand, successfully 
fought and won military campaigns, while also executing an incredibly effective 
transparent system of criminal justice.   
The nation must contend with well organized, proficient, motivated and financed 
groups, operating from lawless regions (e.g., FATA region of Pakistan), failed nation 
states (e.g., Somalia) and semi-governed countries (i.e., Afghanistan, Yemen) that 
severely threaten the national and homeland security of the United States.  As stated by 
Virginia Commonwealth University political professor Dr. William Newman:  
no longer are nation-states the only entities that have the power and 
purpose to challenge the U.S. role as a global authority.  The capacity and 
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motivation of non-state actors, such as Al Qaeda, to wreak havoc with 
mass casualties and enormous economic destruction in the pursuit of their 
political goals has revealed that pursuing an end game falls somewhere in 
between a military solution and criminal justice. (2002)   
The response is to be proactive, get ahead of the enemy, and adopt an approach 
and capabilities to meet the evolving threat.  This thesis has demonstrated that the threat 
and complexities of modern day terrorism require solutions that integrate key elements of 
national power in order to fill in the seams where these now threats exist. 
B. THE PROBLEM  
In 2008, the NCTC SIST identified strategic impediments to meeting objectives 
outlined in the National Implementation Plan for the War on Terrorism (NIP).  One 
identified impediment is the lack of central leadership or permanent interagency structure 
to strategically facilitate the use of classified intelligence information as evidence in the 
prosecution of terrorist subjects.  In this regard, this thesis examined the question of 
whether Federal Article III criminal courts are up to the task to effectively deal with the 
modern day terrorism threat.  The case studies and analysis presented in this thesis 
demonstrated dangerous holes and gaps that exist in the Federal Article III criminal 
process to meet the requirements of: 1) preventing terrorist attacks and; 2) ensuring 
substantive judicial convictions.  
C. THE RECOMMENDATIONS TO MEET THE THREAT 
The modern-day terrorism threat is complex and growing in severity as more 
destructive capabilities become available to those who mean to do the nation harm.  As 
stated above, the issue is not solely one of military, law enforcement, intelligence or 
diplomacy.  It is a predicament that lies within the seams of these disciplines requiring an 
integrated approach of national capabilities.  It is a dilemma that requires “out-of-the 
box” solutions and a break in traditional thinking.  The three recommendations made in 
this thesis are non-traditional, distinctive but feasible.  Most importantly, these 
recommendations focus on meeting the priority of preventing terrorist attacks while  
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ensuring a judicial end game for captured terrorist subjects.  The strong and practical 
recommendations presented in this thesis fuse the essential elements of disruption, 
intelligence collection and prosecution.   
The first recommendation is to establish NCTC as the standalone agency with the 
authority to conduct not just the strategic planning but the coordination and execution of 
the counterterrorism mission. The NCTC Director, who will report directly to the 
President, will have the authority, leverage and responsibility to task and direct strategic 
counterterrorism operations utilizing all the available elements of national power found in 
the interagency community.  This recommendation will enable the counterterrorism 
community to prepare prioritized courses of action in the pursuit of terrorism subjects.  It 
will force careful consideration of the requirements and actions needed concerning the 
collection, handling and disposition of intelligence information as evidence when judicial 
prosecution is the primary endgame goal.   
In order to enact this recommendation strong leadership and weight of the Office 
of the President must advance the effort. The White House will need to draft and push the 
legislation required to grant NCTC the authority needed to exercise the “collaborative 
thuggery” needed to capitalize on the “spirit of collaboration” that exists in the 
counterterrorism community.  Beneath the President, “champions” will be necessary, 
who share the vision to have a successful central strategic counterterrorism organization.  
Ideally, the champions will be the directors of the participating agencies who will bring 
their respective designees to shepherd the process through each respective organization.  
It is important for the President identify cohorts—those who will benefit and ally with the 
plan and the scoundrels—those who perceive a loss of clout, funding or power and will 
oppose the plan if not sabotage it.  Through effective communication, the President must 
convey the message that will focus on accomplishing the shared goals and common 
strategic end game mission—that of protecting the nation from the modern day terrorism 
threat.  By converting even just a few scoundrels into cohorts, a powerful stable of 
champions will emerge to counter the remaining detractors to the NCTC plan.  
Identifying a consigliore, a highly respected insider who can advise of the pitfalls and 
likely difficulties in making the execution strategy work will also be important.  The 
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consigliore would also work to exert influence over the scoundrels in the equation by 
bringing them along in the process and giving them confidence their concerns are heard 
and best accommodated.  Retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell and 
former FBI Director Louis Freeh are examples of the high profile and well respected 
individuals who would be accepted as competent and fair to all those involved.   
The second recommendation is to establish a legal U.S. preventative detention 
system utilizing the FISA court as outlined in Chapter V.  This will provide the 
government with a critical counterterrorism tool to preempt attacks and obtain critical 
intelligence without jeopardizing judicial prosecution.  It will facilitate the use of 
evidence identified and obtained as a result of interrogation of those detained.  It will 
facilitate the use of the statements made by those detained in their prosecution as well as 
the prosecutions of their co-conspirators.  It will incapacitate terrorist subjects from the 
fight while building a prosecutable case with available evidence.  In order to enact this 
recommendation Congress must engage the American public in a considerable national 
debate in gain the support needed to create the required legislation.  The President must 
lead this effort by inviting congressional leaders in calling for and establishing a bi-
partisan 9/11 style committee to develop the final recommendations for the framework of 
such a legal regime. 
The third recommendation is to fully and permanently integrate FBI 
counterterrorism agents into tier one Special Operations Command special mission units.  
This will bring an extremely valuable law enforcement capability to the U.S. special 
operations units tasked with pursuing high value terrorism targets (HVTs).  Having 
federal law enforcement agents, which function from the outset as the collectors and 
handlers of the information obtained during the capture of HVTs, will significantly 
mitigate that information being inadmissible in a judicial setting.  Federal law 
enforcement agents can also function as the “arresting agent” and provide a professional 
testimonial capability during the prosecution of captured HVTs, thereby protecting the 
identities of military personnel and intelligence agents.  Federal law enforcement agents 
also bring the inherent skills of sensitive site exploitation, interpersonal communication, 
interrogation and building a case (or target set) from the evidence they collect.  To enact 
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this recommendation, both the senior leadership of the FBI’s National Security Branch 
and DoD’s SOCOM should capitalize on the already excellent working relationship and 
designate a joint task force to enact the plan outlined in this thesis.  
D. CONSEQUENCES 
The cost of inaction or substandard reforms can range from serious to severe.  A 
serious consequence is a terrorist subject not being indicted on charges commensurate 
with his actions and intentions.  A more serious consequence is a convicted terrorist, such 
as Jose Padilla, receiving an inferior sentence that fails to adequately incapacitate the 
individual and the real threat he poses.  A grave consequence is the possibility that a hard 
core terrorist leader, such as Khalid Sheik Mohammad, would have his case and charges 
dismissed due to procedural discrepancies, or worse, is found not guilty because key 
evidence is either thrown out or not available to the prosecution.  A severe consequence 
is the execution of a terrorist attack that could have been prevented by the detention and 
interrogation of an operative based on classified information clearly indicating his 
complicity.  Certainly, an attack that utilizes a weapon of mass destruction resulting in a 
significant loss of life and acute harm to the economic well being of the nation would be 
a calamitous consequence.  However, perhaps the most ominous consequence would be 
the loss of confidence by the American people in their government and its ability to 
adequately protect them from the most apparent and dangerous of threats.  
E. UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS 
The complex issues presented in this thesis cannot be remedied solely by the 
recommendations it offers.  Questions abound that require bold feasible solutions.   
1. What to Do About CIPA? 
One area discussed was the viability of the Classified Information Protection Act 
(CIPA) to adequately meet the demands of introducing and protecting classified 
information in civilian Article III court.  As discussed in Chapter II, CIPA’s intent was to 
protect against the disclosure of classified information by a defendant during an 
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espionage prosecution.  While CIPA has functioned with a measured level of success in 
the prosecution of terrorism subjects there remains a significant need to modify CIPA 
regarding the introduction and protection of non-documentary classified information.  
CIPA needs to be modified in a manner that it would also offer protection of highly 
valuable sources and methods.  However, as the U.S. seeks to balance its ability to 
protect its national/homeland security and provide fair jurisprudence, another question 
that should be considered is does the nation wants to continue to bend its civilian courts 
to meet the contemporary terrorism threat during a time of war?  By attempting to 
conform the tested peacetime criminal courts to meet the uncommon challenges posed by 
an unpredictable and vicious enemy, does the nation ultimately risk both its civil 
protections and its security—not preserving either? 
2. What Is the U.S. Policy and Criteria for the Use of the Military 
Commissions System?  
In October 2006, the U.S. government passed the Military Commission Act 
authorizing trial by Military Commission for violations of the Laws of War and other 
offenses.  As presented in the case study of Suliman Al-Bahlul, since this option is 
legally available and is better suited to try foreign terrorists, shouldn’t the U.S. have a 
defined policy on who will be tried by the Military Commission system?  The recent 
controversial decision to move the trial of Khalid Sheik Mohammad and four other Al 
Qaeda co-conspirators from the Military Commission system in Guantanamo Bay to a 
civilian Article III court in New York begs the question of why assume the risks involved 
(Dienst, 2009)?  The case study of shoe bomber Richard Reid and underwear bomber 
Abdul Mutallab begs the question that if they do not fit the criteria for the commission 
system, then who does?  Shouldn’t the U.S. have a clear policy that outlines who 
qualifies and will be remanded for trial by military commission unless other specified 
factors are present?  Wouldn’t an examination of policy creation and implementation in 
this regard eliminate a haphazard picking and choosing and the political factors that 
appear to be involved?   
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3. Why Not Make the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility a Permanent 
Federal Prison for Terrorists?  
Since October 2001, the U.S. military installation at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba has 
been utilized as a holding point for many of the most sinister captured terrorist leaders, 
planners and operatives.  The U.S. government has reportedly invested upwards of $54 
million in building a modern prison ranging from medium to maximum security (Bowker 
& Kaye, 2007).  It has reportedly invested upwards of $12 million for a judicial facility 
that is specifically built to accommodate military commission trials and the presentation 
of classified evidence (Bowker & Kaye, 2007).  Guantanamo Bay is a secure location, 
evidenced by the nearly 50-year standoff with Fidel Castro’s hostile communist regime 
on one side and the Caribbean Sea on the other.  Capitalizing on the substantial 
investment already made in new infrastructure along with the offshore security it 
naturally provides, shouldn’t the U.S. consider making the Guantanamo Bay facility a 
federal penitentiary for terrorist subjects, run by the Bureau of Prisons?  Furthermore, 
should the recommendation for a legal, preventative detention system be enacted, 
wouldn’t the Guantanamo Bay facility be the natural location to hold terrorism subjects, 
particularly non U.S. citizens capture abroad?  Would it not be safer and less complicated 
to house the most dangerous of terrorism subjects outside the U.S. yet in a facility where 
the threat of escape or release (i.e., Yemen, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia) is nil?   
Innovative feasible solutions to these questions can further advance the U.S. effort 
against global extremism.  Perhaps by enacting the first recommendation presented 
above, a concerted, coordinated, strategic effort by an integrated, authoritative NCTC 
would produce just such solutions.       
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APPENDIX.  THREE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENSURING THE 
END GAME  
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS 
THAT WILL BE PRESENTED 
A. RECOMMENDATION #1: UNITY OF COMMAND.....ESTABLISH NCTC AS 
THE COUNTERTERRORISM INTER AGENCY ORGANIZATION WITH 
AUTHORITY TO DEVELOP PLANS, ASSIGN TASKS, COORDINATE 
OPERATIONS AND DEVELOP DOCTRINE & POLICY 
1. The Need to Modernize the Counterterrorism Structure 
2. The NCTC Solution, the Concerns & Possibilities 
3. Modifying NCTC to Meet the Challenge 
a. Utilizing the DOD example 
4. The Process for Making the NCTC Solution Happen 
5. The Pros & Cons of the NCTC Solution 
a. Pros 
b. Cons 
6. Summary End Game Recommendation 
B. RECOMMENDATION # 2: INSTITUTE A LEGAL U.S. PREVENTATIVE 
DETENTION SYSTEM UTILIZING THE FISA COURT 
1. Dispelling the Misconception, a U.S. Preventative Detention System is 
Possible 
2. Developing a Preventative Detention Framework that meets Disruption. 
Intelligence Collection and Prosecution Requirements. 
a. The Wittes Preventative Detention Framework 
b. Recommendations for Modifying the Wittes Model  
(1) The system would include U.S. persons 
(2) The system must have emergency authorization capability 
(3) The system would provide an initial 25-day detention 
period. Six-month judicial review and a two-year limit.  
(4) The system would utilize the FISA Court 
(5) The system could implement a “cleared Grand Jury” 
concept 
(6) The system will have a five-year sunset clause and regular 
congressional review 
3. The Process for Making the U.S. Preventative Detention System Happen  
4. Pros and Cons of a Legal U.S. Preventative Detention System 
a. Pros 
b. Cons 
5. Summary End Game Recommendation 
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C. RECOMMENDATION # 3: FULL INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION OF FBI 
AND SOCOM  
1. Threats of Purpose, Threats of Context and National Strategy Objective 
2. Bringing the Law Enforcement Capability to the Special Operations 
Mission 
a. Getting the Right Personnel in the Right Places 
3. Pros and Cons of full FBI and SOCOM Interagency Integration 
a. Pros 
b. Cons 
4.  Summary End Game Recommendation 
D. SUMMARY 
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